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CHADLEY KEITH LALVERT,
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Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated assault, a third
degree felony, and threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight
or quarrel, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Defendant Chadley Calvert pulled a gun on some passing
neighborhood children whom he thought had stepped onto his lawn. When
three parents arrived to speak to Calvert about it, he pulled a gun on the1n
too, pointing it at one of them.

Calvert was convicted of one count of

aggravated assault for pointing the gun at one parent and of one count of
threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel

(brandishing) for taking out his gun during a quarrel with multiple people
present.
1.

~

Has Calvert overcome the strong presumption that his counsel

reasonably chose not to seek dismissal of either the aggravated assault or
brandishing counts before or during trial?
2.

Has Calvert overcome the strong presumption that his

counsel reasonably chose not to seek merger of the aggravated assault and
brandishing counts after trial?

Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance claim raised for the first
time on appeal presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v.

Bedell, 2014 UT 1, if 20, 322 P.3d 697.
3. Did the trial court properly admit evidence under rule 404(b) of
Calvert's prior assault and threat against a neighbor over a trivial matter,
for the purpose of rebutting his self-defense and fabrication claims?

Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to admit evidence under
rule 404(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45,
if17, 349 P.3d 712.
The trial court admitted-without objection-a recording of a 911 call
made after Calvert pulled out his gun. When the jury retired to deliberate,
the prosecutor offered to leave a laptop so that the jury could listen to the
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recording during deliberations if they chose. The laptop contained no case
files, email, or other outside case information. Defense counsel did not
object at the time, but later moved to arrest judgment because the jury
might have been exposed to "outside materials or influences" from the
prosecutor's laptop, which created "the appearance of impropriety."
Defense counsel did not then, and has not now, offered any evidence that
the jury used the laptop at all, let alone to access improper material.
4.

Has Calvert overcome the strong presumption that counsel

performed objectively reasonably when he raised no objection to the
jury's having access to the prosecutor's laptop to listen to the 911
recording?

Standard of Review. See issues 1 and 2.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A: 1
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-1-402 (statutory merger);
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-103 (aggravated assault);
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-506 (brandishing).

1

Unless otherwise noted, the State cites to the current versions of the

Code.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of facts. 2

One summer evening, a group of about seven neighborhood children
walked in front of Calvert's house. R283:92-93, 105, 118-19, 123-24, 161-62.
As they passed, Calvert swore and yelled at them for stepping onto his lawn
and he threatened to shoot them. Id. at 93, 171. Vv"nen one of the children
talked back, Calvert pulled out a gun with a laser sight. Id. at 83-84, 243;
DEl. Some of the children ran to tell their parents. Id. at 136-37, 252-54, 27576.
Two of the children's fathers-Hugo and his brother Adon Holguincame immediately to talk to Calvert about what happened. R283:95, 120,
147, 180, 223, 232, 265-66, 277. They were accompanied by three of the
children-Ar.H., K.P., and K.H. -and Hugo's wife, Yolanda. Id. at 174, 176,
225, 255, 260, 277. While Calvert argued with the two men, he pulled out a
gun with a laser sight and pointed it at or near Adon. Id. at 147, 158, 180,
197, 202, 235, 245-47. He also pointed it at Hugo's chest "several times." Id.
at 120, 138, 141, 180, 223, 254, 265-66, 277, 282. This went on for about" eight

2

Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are recited in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if 3, 299 P.3d
892.
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or nine minutes." Id. at 202. Ar.H. called 911. Id. at 149-50, 186; SE2 (911
recording).

When Ar.H. told Calvert that he was going to call police,

Calvert went into his garage and "put the gun away." R283:183-84.
When police arrived, Calvert told them that he had been sitting on his
steps with a "laser pointer" and that he had it "just pointed at the ground."

Id. at 303. Calvert said that he had a gun inside the house, but claimed that
he did not have time to grab it during the quarrel. Id. at 304. He showed
police a gun without a laser sight. Id. Police asked if he had another gun in
his garage. Id. at 305-06. Calvert admitted that he did, but claimed that it
was unloaded.

Id. at 307-08.

Police found a loaded gun- with a laser

sight- in the garage. Id. at 308-09; SE 5, 6, 7. The testifying officer did not
see a laser pointer at the house other than the sight on the loaded gun.
R208:309.

Defendant's story.

At trial, Calvert admitted, for the first time, to

pointing his gun at one of the men- he did not know which- but claimed
to have acted in defense of himself and his property.

R284:62, 78.

He

testified that he took "great pride" in his yard and was upset when he saw a
"bunch of children just causing all sorts of ruckus" there, such as according to him-scratching his car with a tree branch and breaking one of
his sprinklers. Id. at 53-56. Calvert admitted to swearing at the children

r
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before they left. Id. at 56-57. Calvert claimed to have then sat down on his
porch to eat a burrito when someone "scared the hell out of him" by trying
to grab him through his porch railing. Id. at 56-62, 78. Calvert ran inside his
house to grab one of his guns. Id. at 56-62. Hearing his garage alarm go off,
Calvert went to his garage to find a man there. Id. at 58-61. Calvert pointed
his gun at the man and told him to leave. Id. at 62.

B.

Summary of proceedings.
The State charged Calvert with aggravated assault, a third degree

felony, and threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or
quarrel (brandishing), a class A misdemeanor.

R1-3.

The aggravated

assault charge was based on Calvert's pointing the gun at Hugo Holguin.
R196 (aggravated assault elements instruction listing Hugo as victim);
R284:130 (prosecutor closing argument specifying Hugo as victim of
aggravated assault).

The brandishing charge was based on Calvert's

drawing or exhibiting a gun while in a quarrel in the presence of two or
more people. See R284:131; Rl 99.
Over Calvert's objection, the trial court allowed the State to present
evidence under rule 404(b) and the doch·ine of chances that Calvert had
previously assaulted and threatened to kill a neighbor during an argument
over a trivial matter for the purpose of rebutting Calvert's self-defense
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claim- and by extension, disproving his implicit claim that all of the other
witnesses were fabricating their version of events. R93-108 (State's motion
in limine to admit 404(b) evidence); R283:28-30 (trial court ruling admitting
404(b) evidence to rebut "fabrication as well as self-defense").
The trial court also admitted-without objection-a recording of the
911 call. SE2; R283:150. Before deliberations, the prosecutor offered to let
the jury use a laptop from his office to listen to the 911 call during
deliberations; Calvert did not object. R284:147.
The jury convicted Calvert as charged. R166-67. Before sentencing,
defense counsel moved to arrest judgment, asserting that letting the jury
take the laptop into deliberations was error.

R209-11.

He proffered no

evidence that the jurors had even used the computer or that they had
accessed anything improper. Id. He instead argued that the possibility of
access to outside information-whether from files on the computer or the
internet-imputed an "appearance of impropriety" that was "impossible to
overcome." R211. The prosecutor explained that his office used the laptop
only at jury trials as a tool, that it did not have any case information on it,
and he did not know whether it was even internet-capable at the
courthouse. R226-27; R282:17-19. He also noted that Calvert had not shown
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that the jury viewed anything improper on the laptop. R226-27. The trial
court denied the motion to arrest judgment. R282:21.
The court then sentenced Calvert to suspended statutory prison and
jail terms, and placed him on probation with conditions including 90 days
in jail, 50 hours of community service, a mental health evaluation, and any
recommended treatment. Id. at 25-26. Calvert timely appealed. R273-75,
276-77.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I: Calvert first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for

not moving either before or during trial to (1) dismiss either the aggravated
assault or the brandishing charge; or (2) make the brandishing charge a
lesser-included offense of the assault charge. Calvert's arguments rest on a
faulty premise- that he was charged for a single act. The evidence shows
separate acts for each charge. It was obvious from the jury instructions and
counsel's arguments that the aggravated assault charge related only to
Calvert's pointing the gun at Hugo.

That left the independent act of

exhibiting a weapon in a fight or quarrel in front of two or more people.
Defense counsel could have reasonably decided not to move for dismissal of
one court or inclusion of a lesser offense because had he done so, the
prosecutor would have simply emphasized that the evidence supported not
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only the two charged counts, but additional assault and brandishing counts
as well. Any motion to dismiss one of the counts or to make brandishing a
lesser-included offense would have surely failed.
Issue II: Calvert alternatively argues that his counsel was ineffective

for not moving to merge the two counts after conviction. He argues both for

Finlayson merger and statutory merger. Because this case does not involve
any kidnapping or unlawful detention offense, Finlayson merger does not
apply. Statutory merger does not apply for essentially the same reasons
that counsel did not perform deficiently in not moving to dismiss one count:
separate conduct supported separate charges. Because there was no valid
basis for merger, counsel could not have been ineffective for not seeking it.
Issue III: Calvert next argues that the trial court abused its discretion

under rule 404(b) and the doctrine of chances by admitting evidence that he
had previously assaulted and threatened a neighbor over a trivial matter for
the purpose of rebutting his fabrication and self-defense claims. He argues
that the h·ial court admitted the evidence for the improper purpose of
showing his bad character under rule 404(a); that it was not relevant
because it was unrelated to this case and factually dissimilar; that rebutting
fabrication is not a proper purpose where the defendant admits that an
altercation took place; that rebutting self-defense is not a proper purpose
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under these facts; that a single prior instance cannot show relevance under
the doctrine of chances; that its probative value was substantially
outweighed by its danger for unfair prejudice because it only served to
show his bad character; and that the trial court did not scrupulously
examine the prior assault evidence.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion to admit the prior
fight evidence. The prior assault was relevant to the proper, noncharacter
purposes of rebutting Calvert's self-defense and fabrication claims. A single
prior instance may be relevant under the doctrine of chances due to the low
baseline likelihood of being falsely accused by one's neighbors of assaulting
and threatening them over trivial matters.
And the evidence's probative value was not substantially outweighed
by the danger for unfair prejudice under rule 403 where the other conduct
was both similar to and less serious than the charged conduct. The record
also shows that the trial court scrupulously examined the evidence.
But even if the evidence were improperly admitted, any error was
harmless where Calvert's story was incredible, the evidence of his guilt was
overwhelming, the trial court gave a limiting instruction, and the prosecutor
did not mention the other conduct in opening state1nent, closing argument,
or at any other time.
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Issue IV: Calvert finally argues that his trial counsel was ineffective

for not objecting when the prosecutor offered a laptop for the jury to use
should they desire to listen to the 911 call recording during deliberations.
/~

Calvert argues that this Court should presume that the very presence of the
laptop- even without evidence of improper use-violated his rights to
counsel and jury trial. But a defendant like Calvert claiming ineffective
assistance must show both deficient performance and prejudice. He can
show neither because the problem that he posits- that the jury might have
accessed information outside the evidence - is based on pure speculation.
Proof of ineffective assistance must be a demonstrable reality, not a
speculative matter.

ARGUMENT
I.
Because the aggravated assault and brandishing counts were
based on different conduct, Calvert cannot overcome
Strickland's strong presumption that counsel performed
effectively by not seeking dismissal of the brandishing count.

Calvert asserts that the brandishing count is a lesser-included offense
of the aggravated assault count. Aplt.Br. 15-21. He argues that his trial
counsel was thus ineffective either for (1) not moving to dismiss the lesser
count at the end of the State's case, or (2) not seeking jury instructions that
would have treated the brandishing count as a lesser-included offense of
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aggravated assault.

Id. at 21-22.

Calvert asserts that counsel's alleged

failure subjected him "to a conviction twice for essentially the same
conduct." Id. at 22.
Calvert can prove neither deficient performance nor prejudice
because it was clear from the evidence before the jury that the two charges
were based on different conduct. Failure to bring motions unsupported by
the facts or law is never unreasonable, nor can it be prejudicial.
A. To prevail, Calvert must prove that no reasonable attorney
would have forgone a motion to dismiss or for a lesserincluded-offense instruction.

Ineffective assistance requires proof of both (1) deficient performance
and (2) prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

Establishing deficient performance requires the defendant to prove that no
reasonable attorney would have done what counsel did. Id. at 687-88; State

v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,

il 6 (defendant must "persuad[e] the court that there

was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions.") (citation and
quotation omitted).
To "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight," reasonableness is
evaluated from "counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689.

It is also viewed under "prevailing professional norms," rather than

"best practices" or "common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770,
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778 (2011 ). Review of counsel's performance is highly deferential because,
unlike the reviewing court, counsel "observed the relevant proceedings,
knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with
opposing counsel, and with the judge." Id. at 788. Thus, there are "countless
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case" - even "the best
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same
way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Establishing prejudice requires the defendant to show that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."

Id. at 694.

A

reasonable probability is one "sufficient to undennine confidence in the
outcome. It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding.

Counsel's errors must be so

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-88 (quotations and citation omitted).
Proof of prejudice must be based on a "demonstrable reality and not a
speculative matter." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations
and quotation omitted).
A defendant can prove neither deficient performance nor prejudice if
the motion he argues counsel should have filed would have surely failed.
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Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, if 222, 344 P.3d 581 (holding no ineffective
assistance for not challenging jury instruction on appeal where challenge
would have "surely failed" and "[i]t follows that it would have hardly been
obvious to appellate counsel to challenge the instruction").

B.

Counsel reasonably forwent a motion to dismiss or to treat
the brandishing count as a lesser-included offense because it
was clear that the two charges were based on separate
conduct.
Calvert's argument that counsel should have moved to dismiss the

brandishing count-or at least sought to have it treated as a lesser-included
offense of aggravated assault- rests entirely on his assumption that the
brandishing count is in fact necessarily included in the aggravated assault
count. It is not. The evidence, argument, and jury instructions make clear
that the aggravated assault and threatening counts were based on
completely different acts: the aggravated assault count was based on
Calvert's pointing the gun at Hugo; the brandishing count was based on his
exhibiting the gun during a quarrel in the presence of two or more
persons-that is, either when he threatened the seven children with the gun,
or the adults and children who later confronted him.
A defendant cannot be convicted of both a greater and a necessarily
included offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3). An offense is statutorily
included under only three circumstances: (1) if it "is established by proof of
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the same or less than all the facts required to establish" the greater charge;
(2) it" constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation
to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included"; or (3) it "is
specifically designated by statute as a lesser included offense." Id. Only the
first circumstance is at issue here.
This test focuses purely on the language of the statutes at issue, and is
the same as the "necessarily included" standard applicable when the
prosecution requests a lesser-included-offense instruction at trial: the
elements of the lesser offense must be "necessarily included within the
statutory elements of the" greater offense. State v. Carruth, 1999 UT 107,
,r,13-18, 993 P.2d 869; see also State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 155-57 (Utah 1983).
In other words, "[t]he offenses must be such that the greater cannot
be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser." Carruth,
1999 UT 107, if 6 (quoting Baker, 67 P.2d at 155-56). This means that as long
as the lesser offense does not contain any element not found in the greater
charged offense, the lesser offense is necessarily included. Id. at ,I17. It also
means that if the two charges are based on separate conduct, one cannot be
necessarily included in the other. Cf State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97-98 (Utah
1983) (merging aggravated robbery and theft where "the only evidence
before the jury" showed a theft occurring as part of the robbery).
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Here, brandishing is not necessarily included in aggravated assault
because it has an additional element that aggravated assault does not.
Brandishing is also not necessarily included in aggravated assault here
because it was based on separate conduct.
To prove aggravated assault, the State needed to show that Calvert (1)
threatened another; (2) "accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another"; and (3) used a "dangerous
weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.
Aggravated assault thus criminalizes each time a person threatens
another with a show of immediate force using a dangerous weaponrelevant here, each thne he points a gun at "another."

See, e.g., State v.

Syvongsa, 2012 UT App 277, ~6, 288 P.3d 43 (holding evidence sufficient for
aggravated assault where "Defendant pointed a gun directly at" the victim
while "yelling s01nething"); see also Harris v. State, 35 S.W.3d 819, 823-24
(Ark. Ct. App. 2000) (pointing gun suffices for aggravated assault); People v.

Raviart, 93 Cal. App. 4th 258, 263 (2001) (similar); Watson v. State, 689 S.E.2d
104, 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (similar); State v. Julien, 34 So.3d 494, 499 (La.
Ct. App. 2010) (similar); Sosa v. State, 177 S.W.3d 227, 231-32 (Texas Ct. App.
2005) (similar); cf State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1995) ("the only
possible inference to be made when someone holds a loaded gun to the
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head of another and issues an order is that failure to comply will result in
use of the gun.").
To prove brandishing, the State needed to prove that Calvert (1) "in
the presence of two or more persons"; (2) drew or exhibited a dangerous
11

11

weapon; (3) in an angry and threatening manner"; during (4) a fight or
quarrel." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506. Brandishing thus criminalizes each
time a person angrily and threateningly draws or exhibits a dangerous
weapon during a fight when two or more people are present. See, e.g., State

v. Phelps, 2005 UT App 451 U, *1 (holding evidence sufficient for brandishing
where evidence established that defendant "exhibited his gun to" the
victim); see also State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, ,I,I2-3, 19-20, 15 P.3d 635
11

(holding evidence sufficient where defendant brandished a 15 to 18 inch
club" during angry confrontation with two women).
Because brandishing requires an additional element that assault does
not-the presence of two or more persons-it is not a statutorily lesserincluded offense.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (defining lesser-

included offense as requiring proof of the "same or less" than the facts of
the greater crime, constituting an attempt, solicitation, etc. of greater
offense, or designated by statute as lesser offense); State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d
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874, 878 (Utah 1985) (holding offense lesser-included where "the jury was
not required to find any additional elements to convict").

It is true, as Calvert points out, Aplt.Br. at 17-18, that a broader
standard applies when a defendant seeks a lesser-included offense at trial.
Under that "evidence-based standard" -which does not require that the
lesser offense be necessarily included in the greater offense-a defendant is
entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction when some of the elements
of the offenses merely "overlap" and the evidence provides a rational basis
for acquitting on the greater charge and convicting of the lesser. Baker, 671
P.2d at 154-59.
Thus, regardless of whether Calvert might have been able to get a
brandishing lesser offense instruction on the aggravated assault charge if he
had sought one, see State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah 1984) (holding
that brandishing and aggravated assault have "overlapping elements" of
requiring threats and use of weapon), he would not have been entitled to a
dismissal of the brandishing charge because it was not necessarily included
in the aggravated assault charge. See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-506 (requiring
brandishing to be conunitted in the "presence of two or more persons").
Calvert also would not have been entitled to dismissal of the
brandishing charge because it and the assault charged were based on
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separate acts. "[A]cts are separate" -and thus separately chargeable- "if
they are not necessary to each other or are sufficiently separated by time
and space." State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ,I21, 71 P.3d 624 (citations
omitted); see also State v. Roth, 2001 UT 103,

'if 8, 37 P.3d 1099 (upholding

separate convictions where clear from verdict that convictions based on
separate evidence).
The evidence at trial supported two brandishings. A.C. testified that
as the group of children initially passed Calvert's house, Calvert became
upset, "pulled out a gun," and threatened to "to shoot" them. 3 R283:93-94,
105. And Adon testified that Calvert threatened him while pointing a gun
at the ground between them. R282:235, 246. As many as two other adults
and three children would have been present at the time. R283:174, 176, 225,
255, 260, 277.
Calvert's brandishing a gun while yelling obscenities at seven
children-or while later arguing with the three adults-was "not necessary"
to Calvert's pointing the gun at Hugo. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, if 21. And

3

Though her trial testimony differed on this point, K.P.' s police
statement at the time of these events corroborated that Calvert pulled out a
red laser-which she thought might have been a flashlight-during his
argument with the children. Id. at 212-14. And the officer stated that he
saw no separate laser pointer either inside or outside Calvert's home.
R283:309.
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there was at least one clear break in time between offenses when the
children left to tell the adults and the three adults and three children
returned. Id. Further, it was clear to the jury that the aggravated assault
was based on Calvert's pointing the gun at Hugo. R196; R294:130. And no
one argued at trial that pointing the gun at Hugo was also the basis for the
brandishing charge.

R283: 87-88 (State opening); R284:13-15 (defense

opening); R284:129-36, 142-44 (State closing and rebuttal); R284:136-41
(defense closing).
Given the evidence of separate acts for each charge, counsel could
reasonably decide not to move to dismiss one or the other charge or to make
the brandishing a necessarily lesser-included offense of the aggravated
assault. Because there were separate bases, any such motion would have
surely failed. See State v. Johnson, 2015 UT App 312, ,I16, 803 Utah Adv. Rep.
33 (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where defense motion would have

been futile). If defense counsel had done so, the prosecutor would have
merely emphasized the separate nature of the charges. It could have also
prompted the prosecutor to emphasize that the evidence supported two
potential brandishings - one against the children, and one against the
adults-as well as four aggravated assaults for Calvert pointing his gun at
Hugo, Adon, Ar.H., and A.C. R283:107-09 (A.C. testifying that Calvert
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pointed gun at A.C. and Ar.H.); id. at 180 (Ar.H. testifying that Calvert
pointed gun at Adon and Hugo); id.at 202 (K.P. testifying that Calvert
pointed gun at Adon and Hugo); id. at 254, 265-66, 277 (two adults testifying
;,i'.\

9

that Calvert pointed gun at Hugo).
Calvert cursorily adds that counsel was ineffective for not moving to
dismiss one or the other counts as multiplicitous.

Aplt.Br. 19-21.

This

assertion fails for two reasons. First, because the State filed two charges
under two different code sections, they could not have been multiplicitous.
Multiplicity forbids the State from charging a single offense as multiple
offenses- that is, from charging multiple counts of the same offense. See

State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ,I,125-27, 356 P.3d 1258 (holding that defendant
was subject to twelve counts of discharge of a firearm for a drive-by
shooting in which he shot twelve times); State v. Hattrich, 2013 UT App 177,

if 133-35, 317 P.3d 433 (holding that defendant was subject to multiple
counts of sexual offenses because the legislature criminalized each act, not
each course of conduct). As explained, that did not happen here.
Second, even if the multiplicity doch·ine could apply to different code
sections, that would not aid Calvert. Whether a charge is multiplicitous
depends upon the "unit of prosecution" -what the legislature criminalized.

Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, if if 8-9. As explained, aggravated assault criminalizes
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each pointing of the gun at a person, and brandishing criminalizes each
display of a weapon during a fight in the presence of two or more persons.
The evidence supported multiple counts of both brandishing and
aggravated assault, but the State only charged one of each. R283:93-94 (A.C.
testifying that Calvert "pulled out a gun" during argument with children);
R283:107 (A.C. testifying that Clavert pointed gun at Ar.H.); R283:120, 158,
254, 265-66, 277 (multiple witnesses testifying that Calvert pointed gun at
Hugo); R283:180, 197, 202 (Ar.H. and K.P. testifying that Calvert pointed
gun at both Hugo and Adon); R283:235, 247-47 (Adon testifying that Calvert
pointed gun at ground in front of him); cf State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245,
,r,32-33, 314 P.3d 1014 (holding that aggravated burglary, aggravated
kidnapping, and aggravated assault did not merge where the State
presented "evidence to support multiple variants of each crime"). Thus,
counsel could have reasonably decided to forgo a multiplicity challenge.
In this light, counsel also could have reasonably decided not to
request-as Calvert argues he was required to, Aplt.Br. 21-that the trial
court require the State to elect which charge it desired to proceed on. And
for the same reasons, counsel could have reasonably decided not to request
that the brandishing charge be made a lesser-included offense. Cf State v.

Smith, 2003 UT App 52, ~,I29-30, 65 P.3d 648 (holding no plain error for not
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giving lesser-included instruction on brandishing in aggravated assault case
where defendant claimed "total innocence"), overruled in part on other

grounds by 2005 UT 57, 122 P.3d 615.
For similar reasons, counsel could have reasonably decided not to
move for a directed verdict before jury deliberations.

Aplt.Br. 21.

A

directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and is
granted only when, viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most
favorable to the verdict, no reasonable juror could have convicted. State v.

Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ~177, 299 P.3d 892. And it is the province of the jurynot the appellate court- to determine witness credibility. State v. Riker, 2015
UT App 293, ,I2, 801 Utah Adv. Rep. 32. A reasonable juror could have
believed the testimony of the State's witnesses over Calvert's self-serving,
inconsistent tale- and could have relied on at least two separate acts for the
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brandishing count. Thus, a directed verdict motion would have "surely
failed." 4 Menzies, 2014 UT 40, ,f 222.

C.

Because the counts were based on separate conduct, Calvert
also cannot prove prejudice.
Calvert also cannot prove prejudice- that is, a reasonable likelihood

of a different result absent the alleged error-for essentially the same
reasons that he cannot show deficient performance.

The charges were

based on separate conduct. Because a motion to dis1niss or consolidate the
counts based on separate would have surely failed, making the motion
would not have made a difference. Menzies, 2014 UT 40, ,f 222.

4

Regarding the lesser-included offense, Calvert has not overcome
Strickland's strong presumption of effective representation for a second
reason: counsel could have reasonably decided not to seek a lesser-included
of brandishing because it was not material to his chosen strategy. Counsel's
chosen strategy here was to seek full acquittal by relying on Calvert's
testimony. R284:13-15 (defense opening statement), 136-41 (defense closing
statement). Such an "all or nothing" defense, "though risky, is a reasonable
trial strategy." State v. Carson, 357 P.3d 1064, 1072 (Wash. 2015); see also
Mccrady v. State, 461 S.W.3d 443, 450 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (citing cases).
This is particularly true where, as here, that sh·ategy is based on the
defendant's statements. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (holding that
reasonableness of counsel's decisions "depends critically" on "information
supplied by the defendant"); Davis v. State, 653 S.E.2d 104, 106 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007) (holding '" all-or-nothing' defense" reasonable where defendant
claimed self-defense). It does not matter that other strategies may have
been equally reasonable or even more reasonable. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT
15, if ~41, 43, 328 P.3d 841; Carson, 357 P.3d at 1071-72.
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II.

Because the aggravated assault and brandishing convictions
were based on different conduct, Calvert cannot overcome
Strickland's strong presumption that counsel performed
effectively by not seeking to merge the two at sentencing.

Calvert alternatively argues that his counsel was ineffective for not
moving to merge the two convictions at sentencing. Aplt.Br. 23-27. Though
he conflates them into a single test, he actually raises two distinct merger
arguments: (1) Finlayson merger and (2) statutory merger.
Calvert again cannot prove deficient performance because Finlayson
merger applies only when one of the convictions involves kidnapping or an
unlawful detention, and, as explained, there can be no statutory merger
because the two convictions were based on separate conduct.
A. The two convictions do not merge under Finlayson because
neither offense involved a detention.

Finlayson merger applies only to cases involving both a kidnapping or
unlawful detention and a host offense in which some detention is inherent.

See State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ,r,r17-19, 994 P.2d 1243 (citing State v.
Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981)). Because there was no kidnapping offense
here, Finlayson is inapposite. Counsel could thus have reasonably decided
not to seek merger on this basis.
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B.

The two convictions do not merge statutorily because they
were based on separate conduct.

As explained in Point I, statutory merger applies when a defendant is
II

convicted of both an offense and a lesser offense established by proof of
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of
the" greater offense.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402.

Where, as here, the
II

greater offense has multiple variants, the court must consider the evidence
to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship exists between the
specific variations of the crimes actually proved at trial." Hill, 674 P.2d at
97.
As explained, the variant of aggravated assault at trial was a (1) threat
accompanied by (2) an immediate show of force using (3) a dangerous
weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. Brandishing was not fully subsumed
into aggravated assault because it required two elements nowhere in
aggravated assault: (1) a "fight or quarrel," and (2) the presence of "two or
more persons." Id.§ 76-10-506. These additional elements preclude merger.

State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, 133, 128 P.3d 1179 (holding no statutory merger
where alleged included offense required additional element); State v. Ross,
951 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah App. 1997) (explaining that statutory merger
inapplicable if jury required to find additional element for lesser offense).
And as stated, the convictions also had separate factual bases. Cf State v.
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Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, if if30-35, 314 P.3d 1014 (holding no merger of
offenses where the "jury had before it evidence to support multiple variants
of each crime").

Thus, counsel could reasonably choose not to seek

statutory merger.
In sum, Calvert has proven neither deficient performance nor
prejudice any motion to merge would have surely failed.
III.
The trial court properly admitted evidence under rule 404(b)
that Calvert previously assaulted and threatened a neighbor
over a triviality for the purpose of rebutting self-defense and
fabrication.

The trial court admitted evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence, and the doctrine of chances that Calvert had previously assaulted
a neighbor and threatened to kill her during an argument over a trivial
matter. The trial court admitted the evidence for the purpose of rebutting
Calvert's self-defense claim and his implicit charge that the other witnesses
iiJI

were fabricating their stories. R283:30. Trial courts have broad discretion to
admit such evidence, and their decisions are overturned only if they are
"beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95,

if 12, 802

Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (citation and quotation omitted).
Calvert argues that the trial court abused its discretion because: (1)
disproving fabrication was not a proper purpose under rule 404(b) where he
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did not deny that the incident took place, only that it took place differently
than the State's witnesses testified; (2) the evidence was not relevant under
rule 402; (3) the trial court erroneously relied on the doctrine of chances
because a single prior incident cannot show intent under that doctrine; (4)
the h·ial court did not scrupulously examine the evidence before admitting
it; and (5) the trial court improperly weighed the danger for unfair prejudice
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt.Br. 29-40.
The trial court was well within its discretion to admit the pnor
assault. But even if it were not, any error was clearly harmless where the
evidence of Calvert's guilt was overwhelming, his own testimony was
incredible, the other act testimony was brief, the court gave a limiting
instruction, and the prosecutor did not mention the other act in opening
statement or closing argument.
A. The trial court admitted the brief testimony and instructed
the jury to consider it, if at all, solely to determine Calvert's
self-defense and fabrication claims.

Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence of two prior assaults
and threats that Calvert had made against neighbors: (1) a 2008 incident in
Holladay in which Calvert swore at and threatened to kill Camille Little
after she confronted him for taking pictures of her house; and (2) a 1999
incident in West Valley in which Calvert drove his car sh·aight at Pat Wall's
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car, swerved at the last moment, and then profanely threatened that he
would kill Wall. R93-108. The State sought to use both incidents to rebut
any claims of fabrication and self-defense, and argued that they met the four
foundational requirements under the doctrine of chances set forth in State v.

Verde, 2012 UT 60, 296 P.3d 673. Id. Both the State and Calvert fully briefed
the issue under rules 404(b) and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Id.; R115-27.
Calvert responded that (1) the real purpose of the proposed evidence
was to show a "propensity to commit crime"; (2) that rebutting fabrication
was not a proper purpose because fabrication required a claim that the
victims concocted the whole altercation, whereas Calvert had agreed that
the altercation occurred, but merely disagreed about what happened during
it; (3) that rebutting self-defense was not a proper purpose because the State

was not seeking to explain the victims' actions. Rl 15-20. He also argued
that the doctrine of chances was inapplicable because, among other things,
multiple occurrences were required, the events were dissimilar, and the
charges in the prior cases had been dismissed. R120-125. He also argued
that both incidents were unfairly prejudicial because they went only to
propensity. R124-26.
The trial court heard argument on the motion before trial, which
included a discussion of relevant case law and the danger of unfair
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prejudice.

R283:6-30.

The trial court excluded the older West Valley

incident as "a little bit far afield," but admitted the more recent Holladay
incident under the four foundational requirements for the doctrine of
chances set out in Verde and argued by the prosecutor. Id. at 30. The trial
court found that the evidence was: (1) material to disprove self-defense and
fabrication, which was in genuine dispute; (2) roughly similar to the
charged offense in that Calvert had argued with and threatened to kill his
neighbors both times; (3) the accusations were independent of each other,
made by different neighbors in three different cities; and (4) that the
threshold frequency of being falsely accused of threatening to kill one's
neighbors was low. R283:28-29; see also R98-105. The court further ruled
that the danger for unfair prejudice was not "substantially outweighed by
the prejudicial effect" under rule 403. R283:30.
Before Ms. Little testified about the Holladay incident, the trial court
introduced her to the jury as a "special reasons witness," and stated that he
would instruct them later regarding the purpose of her testimony.
R283:288. Ms. Little testified that Calvert had sworn at her, pushed her
down, and threatened to kill her when she confronted him about taking
pictures of her house. R283:291-94. She did not know any of the victims in
this case. Id. at 289.
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The prosecutor did not reference Ms. Little's testimony in any other
testimony or during opening statement or closing argument. R283:87-88;
R284:129-36, 142-44. The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider
her testimony "if at all, for the limited purposes of: considering defendant's
fabrication and self-defense claim[s] in the current case," and that it could
II

not consider the evidence to prove a character trait of the defendant nor to
show that the defendant has a propensity to act in a certain way." R200.
The jury was further instructed that "defendant [was] on trial for the crime
charged in this case, and for that crime only. You may not convict the
defendant simply because you believe that he may have committed some
other act at some other time." Id.
B.

Rule 404(b) permits other acts evidence to disprove selfdefense and rebut a charge of fabrication.

Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, states that other acts evidence is
II

not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show action in
conformity therewith," but may be "admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b); see State v. Mead,
2001 UT 58,

if 59, 27 P.3d 1115; State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168,

,I31, 256

P.3d 1102; State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, '1f23, 198 P.3d 471; State v. Lee,
831 P.2d 114, 119 (Utah App. 1992). Though 404(b) evidence is often called
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"prior bad acts" evidence, the evidence need neither be prior to the charged
act nor necessarily bad.

See Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C.

Kirckpatrick, Federal Evidence (3d ed. 2007) § 4:28 at 747, 749.

The rule

embraces a wide swath of other acts. Rule 404(b) is an "inclusionary rule."

State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, if 24, 993 P.2d 837. Evidence is presumptively
admissible so long as it is relevant to a proper, noncharacter purpose. Id.
Evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence," and is

II

of

consequence in determining the action."

II

of

Utah R. Evid. 401. To be

consequence," the evidence must go to a contested issue at trial. Verde, 2012
UT 60, ,rif24-26. Relevance is a "very low," binary standard- evidence with
even the "slightest probative value" is relevant and presumptively
admissible. State v. Richardson, 2013 UT 50,

if if 24-29, 308 P.3d 526; Utah R.

Evid. 402 (relevant evidence presumptively admissible).
Proper, noncharacter purposes include- but are not limited to - those
listed in the rule. State v. Housekeeper, 2002 UT 118, i128, 62 P.3d 444 ("While
rule 404(b) lists examples of some of the legitimate purposes for which other
bad acts evidence may be admitted, the list is not exhaustive.").

They

include rebutting a charge of fabrication and disproving a self-defense
claim.

Verde, 2012 UT 60, if47 (rebutting fabrication claim is proper
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noncharacter purpose); State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, ,123, 318 P.3d 1151
(rebutting self-defense claim is proper noncharacter purpose).
A purpose is "proper" if it shows something other than only a bad
character or propensity. But even if the evidence tends to also show a bad
character trait or propensity-as is often the case-that alone does not
render it inadmissible. Rather, it "is only excluded where the sole reason it
is being offered is to prove bad character or to show that a person acted in
conformity with that character." State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah
App. 1994) (citations and additional quotation marks omitted) 5; accord Verde,
2012 UT 60, if24; 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's

Federal Evidence§ 404.20 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed.
1997) (updated 2010) ("Rule 404(b) adopts an inclusionary approach,
generally providing for the admission of all evidence of other acts that is
relevant to an issue in trial, excepting only evidence offered to prove
criminal propensity"). 6

5

State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997) abrogated Olsen, but itself
was abrogated by a rule change as recognized in Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ,I23,
which reaffirmed the rule's inclusionary character.
6

Utah courts consider sources interpreting a similar or identical
federal rule as persuasive authority of the meaning of Utah's rule. See, e.g.,
Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, if 25, 216 P.3d 944.
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Relevant evidence offered for a proper purpose may be excluded
only if the danger for unfair prejudice from the evidence "substantially
outweighs" the evidence's probative value. Utah R. Evid. 403; Decorso, 1999
UT 57, ,r20.

The "exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an

extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly." Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862
F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1988) (citation and quotation omitted); see also

United States v. Glover, 846 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1988) (explaining that "if
judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a
trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal").
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it creates" an undue tendency
to suggest decision on an improper basis." State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984
(Utah 1989).

"The critical question is whether certain testimony is so

prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly weigh the evidence." State v.

Guzman, 2006 UT 12, ,I27, 133 P.3d 363. This Court "presume[s] that the
proffered evidence is admissible unless '[it] has an unusual propensity to
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury."' State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,
,I18, 973 P.2d 404 (citation omitted). A remote-or even equal-chance of a
decision on an improper basis does not render the evidence inadmissible;
rather, the danger for unfair prejudice must substantially outweigh the
evidence's probative value. See Decorso, 1999 UT 57, if 20; Utah R. Evid. 403.
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In evaluating the potential for unfair prejudice from a given piece of
evidence, Utah courts in the past have resorted to the "Shickles factors,"
which include the strength of the evidence, similarity of crimes, time
between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the availability and efficacy
of alternative proof, and the chance that the evidence will "rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility." State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988).
But the Utah Supreme Court has recently made clear that it is the language
of rule 403-not the Shickles factors-that governs. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, if2
("Thus, the governing legal standard for evaluating whether evidence
satisfies rule 403 is the plain language of the rule, nothing more and nothing
less."); Lucero, 2014 UT 15,132,328 P.3d 841 (holding that courts" are bound
by the text of rule 403, not the limited list of considerations outlined in

Shickles."). And the court specifically disavowed this language in Cuttler.
2015 UT 95, ,I20 ("[W]e now make clear that it is inappropriate for a court to
consider the overmastering hostility factor in a rule 403 analysis.").

Of

course, some Shickles factors may be helpful in a given case. Id. at ifi118-19. 7
As stated, the trial court here relied on the doctrine of chances to
admit the evidence. This doctrine is a "theory of logical relevance that rests
on the objective improbability of the same rare misfortune befalling one
7

Cuttler issued after Calvert filed his opening brief.
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individual over and over." Verde, 2012 UT 60, if 47 (citation and quotation
omitted). That is, the more often something similar happens to the sa1ne
person, the less likely it is due to accident, chance, justification, third party
action, or the like. See Verde, 2012 UT 60, ilif 47-52 (discussing doctrine of
chances in context of 404(b) evidence); see also United States v. York, 933 F.2d
1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that if you win the lottery once, you
get congratulated; if you win twice, you get investigated); overruled on other

grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1999).
The paradigmatic example of the doctrine of chances is the "brides in
the bath" case of Rex v. Smith, 11 Crim.App. 229, 84 L.J.K.B. 2153 (1915)
(cited in Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,I49 n.20). The common axiom for which Smith
is cited is that the more one's wives die in bathtub drownings, the less each
drowning looks like an accident. See, e.g., Verde, 2012 UT 60, if 49. But the
doctrine of chances is not limited to disproving mistake or accident; it may
also help to establish other proper purposes. For example, in Smith, similar
bride drownings did not just show a lack of accident; they also helped
establish the killer's identity (the husband); 1nodus operandi (death by
bathtub drowning); plan or motive (marrying women for their money and
killing them to get it); and intent (desire to kill).

All of these proper

purposes under rule 404(b) were supported by the doctrine of chances

-36-

because each occurrence decreased the likelihood not only that they
occurred by accident, but also that someone else did it, that other persons
happened to choose a similar mode of killing, or that the murderer had the
requisite intent. See United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134-35 (4th Cir.
1973).

If evidence is relevant under the doctrine of chances, the State must
show four foundational requirements under rule 403: (1) materiality: that
the "issue for which the uncharged conduct is offered" is in "bona fide
dispute"; (2) similarity: that the other incident(s) have a "rough[]" similarity
to

the charged crime; (3)

independence:

that each accusation

is

"independent of the others"; and (4) frequency: that the defendant was
"accused of the crime ... more frequently that the typical person" is. Verde,
2012 UT 60, ,Iif 57-61 (citations and quotations omitted).
C.

The trial court acted well within its discretion to admit
Calvert's prior assault and threat.

Based on the foregoing standards, the trial court was well within its
discretion to admit the prior assault evidence.
As shown, disproving fabrication and self-defense are proper, noncharacter purposes. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,I47 (rebutting fabrication clahn is
proper noncharacter purpose); Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, ,I23 (rebutting selfdefense is proper noncharacter purpose).
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Ms. Little's testimony was

relevant to show these purposes. It is not often that one is falsely accused
by one's neighbors of assaults and threats over trivial matters. And the fact
that such a rare occurrence allegedly befell Calvert twice made it more
likely that the neighbors were not fabricating their accounts (and that he
was). Calvert's prior assaulting and threats to Ms. Little over a triviality
were relevant to disprove self-defense and fabrication because they made it
less likely that the neighbors here were fabricating a charge that Calvert
assaulted and threatened them over a triviality. By making fabrication less
likely, the evidence concomitantly made Calvert's self-defense claim less
likely.

And its potential for unfair prejudice could not substantially

outweigh its probative value where the allegation there was less serious
than the charges here because it did not involve a gun. See Lucero, 2014 UT
15, ,I35 (holding under rule 403 that evidence of prior abuse was not
unfairly prejudicial because it was "tame in comparison to" the evidence of
charged conduct).
The evidence also met the requirements for the doctrine of chances.
The evidence was (1) material because self-defense and fabrication were in
"bona fide dispute" where Calvert's story was completely different from all
other witnesses; (2) "roughly similar" in that both incidents involved
Calvert flying off the handle at some trivial matter and assaulting and
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threatening his neighbor(s); (3) independent where the victim in the prior
cases did not know any of the victims here; and (4) the threshold level of
being falsely accused of assaulting and threatening one's neighbors is low.
Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,f if 57-61.

Citing Verde, Calvert argues that the trial court improperly relied on
disproving fabrication as a proper purpose because Calvert did not
completely deny the incident, only how the events unfolded. Aplt.Br. 29.
Verde, who was accused of sexual abuse of a child, denied that any sexual
contact took place. 2012 UT 60, ,I9. The supreme court held that evidence
that Verde had prior sexual contact with young adult men was not relevant
to prove intent because intent was not in bona fide dispute, and was thus
not relevant. Id. at ,f 57. But the supreme court also held that the evidence
could be relevant to disprove fabrication if the State sought to admit it for
that purpose, and remanded for the trial court to evaluate that claim in the
first instance. Id. at ,I,I20, 47, 56.
Calvert reasons that because Verde denied that the alleged incident
(sexual abuse) between himself and the victim ever took place, rebutting
fabrication is in bona fide dispute only where a defendant denies that the
incident forming the basis for the charges ever took place.

Aplt.Br. 29.

Because Calvert did not deny that he had a confrontation with his
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neighbors, but he only disagreed with what happened, Calvert asserts that
rebutting fabrication was not in bona fide dispute here. Id.
But Verde does not limit rule 404(b) evidence to rebut total- as
opposed to partial-fabrication. Indeed, Verde itself relied on a rape case-

Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59-where the defendant did not deny having
sex, but rather claimed that she had consented to sexual acts other than
those alleged. Verde, 2012 UT 60,

if 53; Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59,

,r12.

Thus, admitting 404(b) evidence to rebut a charge of partial fabrication is
just as proper to rebut a charge of total fabrication.
Calvert similarly asserts that rebutting self-defense was not a proper
purpose because his case differs from Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, if23, where
this court held that rebutting self-defense was a proper purpose. Labrum
was charged with assaulting his wife. Id. at ir2. During the altercation, his
wife was holding a set of keys, which Labrum landed on during the assault.

Id. at if3.

Labrum claimed self-defense, testifying that his wife used the

keys to attack him.

Id. at ,I4.

This court held that the State properly

introduced 404(b) evidence of prior abuse to show that the wife took the
keys to bed to defend herself against Labrum and to rebut Labrum's selfdefense claim. Id. at ,I23. Calvert acknowledges Labrum, but baldly asserts
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that rebutting self-defense is not a proper purpose here because Labrum "is
not analogous to the incident involving Ms. Little." Aplt. Br. 29-30.
As with Verde, Calvert misunderstands Labrum. Labrum did not limit
the applicability of a given 404(b) purpose to the facts of that case.

If

anything, Labrum supports the State's argument that rebutting self-defense
is a proper purpose. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, if23; see also State v. High, 2012
UT App 180, if48, 282 P.3d 1046 (explaining that gang affiliation evidence
"may be probative to rebut a self-defense claim in some instances").
As explained, the doctrine of chances requires four foundational
elements: materiality, similarity, independence, and frequency. Verde, 2012
UT 60, iJ,57-61. Calvert argues that it is "patently obvious" that a single
incident cannot show the doctrine of chances' frequency requirement,
because the same misfortune must befall an individual "over and over."
Aplt.Br. 31 (citing State v. Lowther, 2015 UT App 180, 356 P.3d 173, cert.

granted, 364 P.3d 48 (Utah 2015)). But while more than one instance may
increase the strength of a given inference, it is not logically required under
the doctrine of chances. See, e.g., State v. Lomu, 2014 UT App 41, ,r,I22-34,
321 P.3d 243 (robbery case admitting evidence of one subsequent robbery
under doctrine of chances). Even a single unlikely instance-such as a prior
lottery win or one prior wife drowning in a bathtub-tends to show that the
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second unlikely instance was not merely a fluke, but the result of the
defendant's conscious actions.
Calvert next argues that the trial court abused its discretion under
rule 403 because the Holladay incident evidence merely showed his
"reprehensible character," and had an "unusual propensity to unfairly
prejudice" the jury against him. Aplt.Br. 32-33 (citation omitted). "[T]he
exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy"
that should be used only "sparingly." Wheeler, 862 F.2d at 1408 (citation and
quotation omitted).
As explained, the existence of dual inferences- one proper, one
improper- does not alone render other acts evidence inadmissible under
rule 403. Rather, the evidence is excluded only where "the sole reason it is
being offered is to prove bad character or to show that a person acted in
conformity with that character." Olsen, 869 P.2d at 1010 (citation and
quotation omitted).

As shown, the evidence here had the proper,

noncharcter purposes of rebutting Calvert's claim of self-defense and
implicit charge of fabrication.
More importantly, the Holladay incident was not the sort of evidence
that would have an "unusual propensity" to unfairly prejudice the jury
against Calvert. Aplt.Br. 33. That kind of evidence includes "gruesome
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crime scene photos, rape victims' sexual histories, and pseudoscientific
methodologies." State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, ,I46, 335 P.3d 900.
Compared to the charged acts, the Holladay incident was fairly tame
because Calvert there did not draw and point a gun like he did here. That
the other acts evidence was less shocking than the evidence of the charged
acts shows that its tendency to unfairly prejudice Calvert was low. Lucero,
2014 UT 15, ,I35 (holding under rule 403 that evidence of prior abuse not
unfairly prejudicial because it was "tame in comparison to" evidence of
charged conduct); cf State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, ,I31, 8 P.3d 1025 (" evidence of
multiple acts of similar or identical abuse is unlikely to prejudice a jury").
Calvert also asserts that because the legal proceedings regarding the
Holladay incident were dismissed, it is "impossible to conclude" that it was
not itself a false accusation. Aplt.Br. 35. But charging is no prerequisite,
and acquittal is no bar, to the admission of 404(b) evidence. See Dowling v.

United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1990); State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ~46,
191 P.3d 17; State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ,I43 n.9, 28 P.3d 1278; Nelson-

Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ,I31.
Calvert finally argues on this point that the h·ial court abused its
discretion because it did not "scrupulously examine" the evidence. Aplt. Br.
38. He asserts-without citation- that the trial court was "hard pressed to
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make such a scrupulous examination if the evidence without an evidentiary
hearing." Aplt.Br. 38. But Calvert never requested an evidentiary hearing
below, and Utah appellate courts have never required one. Cf Cuttler, 2015
UT 95,

,r,r8, 14

(relying on the State's "proffered evidence" to reverse trial

court ruling excluding child sex abuse evidence under rule 403).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court must
"scrupulously" examine 404(b) evidence "in the proper exercise" of its
discretion. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, if 42, 28 P.3d 1278. There is no set
procedure for trial courts to show a scrupulous examination. In the past,
Utah courts have looked to the whole record to see if the trial court
considered all the necessary factors. See State v. Nelson-Waggoner 2000 UT
59, ifl6, 6 P.3d 1120 ("We review the record to determine whether the
admission of [404(b)] evidence was scrupulously examined by the trial
judge.") (citation and quotations omitted).

Evidence of scrupulous

examination-as contained in the parties' briefing and arguments, and the
trial court's ruling- need not be overwhelming; it need show only that the
trial court understood and applied the correct standard. See Widdison, 2001
UT 60,

,r 44

(holding trial court conducted scrupulous examination where

"the parties extensively briefed and argued the issue" of 404(b) evidence);

State v. Nielsen, 2012 UT App 2, iJ16 n.3, 271 P.3d 817 (holding trial court
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made "sufficiently scrupulous examination" where the "parties presented
arguments at various times," and the trial court made "sufficient inquiry"
into Shickles factors, even though it did "not expressly" identify them);

Burke, 2011 UT App 168, if27 n.10 ("We acknowledge that ... the trial court
simply ruled from the bench ... and did not enter any specific findings or
conclusions. However, based on the evidence and argument before the trial
court on this issue, it can be inferred that the trial court 'scrupulously
examined' the relevant evidence."); State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348,

if 38,

57 P.3d 1139 (holding trial court scrupulously examined evidence due to
parties' briefing and arguments, even though it did not make "specific,
detailed findings" on each point).
Thus, scrupulous examination is not a high bar to clear. See, e.g., See

Widdison, 2001 UT 60, if44 (holding trial court conducted scrupulous
examination because "the parties extensively briefed and argued the issue"
of 404(b) evidence); Lomu, 2014 UT App 41, if34 (holding that scrupulous
examination "can be inferred when the trial court has heard arguments on
the relevant issues and has made 'sufficient inquiry"' into issues); Nielsen,
2012 UT App 2, if16 n.3 (holding trial court made "sufficiently scrupulous
examination" because the "parties presented arguments at various times"
and the trial court made "sufficient inquiry" into rule 403, even though it
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did "not expressly" identify factors; Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ,I27 n.10 ("We
acknowledge that ... the trial court simply ruled from the bench ... and did
not enter any specific findings or conclusions.

However, based on the

evidence and argument before the trial court on this issue, it can be inferred
that the trial court 'scrupulously examined' the relevant evidence.");

Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, if 38 (holding trial court scrupulously examined
evidence based on parties' briefing and arguments, even though it did not
make "specific, detailed findings" on each point); but see State v. Lowther,
2015 UT App 180, if35, 356 P.3d 173 (reversing where "the trial court failed
to scrupulously examine the proposed rule 404(b) evidence"), cert. granted,
365 P.3d 48 (Utah 2015); State v. Thornton, 2014 UT App 265, if 47, 339 P.3d
112 (reversing where trial court "did not engage in the scrupulous
examination required'' under rule 404(b)), cert. granted, 352 P.3d 106 (Utah
2015).
The trial court's examination more than sufficed here. It received
briefing and argument from both sides on the relevant facts and law,
including the proper non-character purposes of disproving fabrication and
self-defense. R93-108; R115-27; R283:7-29. It noted the Verde factors and
adopted the State's characterization of them. R283:30. It explicitly found
that the evidence's probative value was not outweighed "by the prejudicial
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effect." Id. And the defense arguments were partially successful in that the
court excluded one of the State's two proposed incidents as "a little bit too
far afield." Id.; cf State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262,

if if 4, 40, 219 P.3d 75

(holding scrupulous examination where trial court evaluated multiple other
acts, admitting some and excluding another).

All these facts show

scrupulous examination. See Lomu, 2014 UT App 41, if34.
In sum, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to admit the
Holladay incident to rebut his self-defense claim and argument that the
other witnesses fabricated their testimony.
Any error was harmless in any event because there was "no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of

the

proceedings." State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ,I73, 311 P.3d 538 (citation
and

quotation

omitted).

The

State's

case

against Calvert

was

overwhelming, the prosecutor did not use the prior assault in arguing
Calvert's guilt here, and the trial court gave a curative instruction. State v.

Ferguson, 2011 UT App 77, ,I,I19-20, 250 P.3d 89 (holding erroneous
admission

of 404(b)

evidence

harmless

where

"overwhelming"); cf State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88,

evidence

of

guilt

if 29 n.8, 361 P.3d 104

(holding no prejudice from co-defendant's invocation of Fifth Amendment
privilege where "prosecutor did not rely on or refer to" it afterwards);
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Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, if37 (holding no misuse of 404(b) evidence where

trial court gave limiting instruction).
First, the evidence of Calvert's guilt was overwhelming: seven
eyewitnesses testified that Calvert threatened several children and adults
with a gun and that he pointed the gun at Hugo. While Calvert's selfserving testimony was inconsistent and incredible, the witnesses' testimony
was consistent and corroborated. For example, Calvert told polilce that he
did not have a loaded gun with a laser sight on it, but police found one in
the garage just as witnesses said they would. R283:183-84, 303-09. Second,
the prosecutor did not mention the Holladay incident in opening statement,
closing arguments, or any other time. See R283:87-88; R284:129-36, 142-44.
Third, Ms. Little's testimony of the Holladay incident was brief, spanning
merely 10 pages of nearly 500 pages of trial transcript. R283:289-99. Its
impact, therefore, was minimal.

Finally, the trial court gave a limiting

instruction. R200. Thus, there is "no reasonable likelihood that" admitting
the Holladay incident "affected the outcome of the proceedings." Davis,
2013 UT App 228, ,I173, 76.
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IV.

Calvert's ineffective assistance claim that the jury might have
been exposed to improper material during deliberations
because they had access to a prosecution laptop to listen to a
911 call is entirely speculative. 8

Calvert argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting
to the jury's taking the prosecution's laptop into deliberations so that they
could listen to the 911 call.

Aplt.Br. 40.

He asserts that counsel was

required to object because the laptop was not evidence, and violated his
rights to counsel and jury trial. Aplt.Br. 43-45. As explained, to prevail,
Calvert must prove both (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice.

St1ickland, 466 U.S. at 689-92. And, again, proof of prejudice n1ust be based
on a "demonsh·able reality and not a speculative matter." Chacon, 962 P.2d
at 50.
A.

Counsel did not object when the prosecutor offered a laptop
for the jury to listen to the 911 call, and the prosecutor
explained that the laptop contained no case files.

After the jury retired to deliberate, the court wanted to ensure that all
of the exhibits "g[o]t back to the jury." R284:146. The prosecutor noted that
one of the exhibits-the 911 recording-was a CD, and offered a laptop for
the jury to use if they wanted to listen to it. Id. at 146-47. The trial court

8

Calvert has also filed a motion for re1nand under rule 23B, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to supplement the record on this claim. The
State responds to that motion separately.
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accepted the prosecutor's offer, and defense counsel did not object.
II

R284:147. The jury was instructed that their verdict must be based only on
the evidence," which included "the testimony and exhibits presented at
trial." R174.
Before sentencing, defense counsel moved to arrest judgment based
on, among other things, the jury's having potentially accessed something
improper on the laptop. R204-13. Though counsel was present when the
prosecutor offered the laptop to the court, R284:147, he now alleged that he
had learned about it only "[s]everal days" after trial from some trial
attendees. R209. Counsel argued that having the laptop accessible to the
jury constituted "other good cause" under rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to arrest judgment because it might have injected "outside
materials or influences" into the deliberations and created an "appearance
of impropriety." R210. He proffered no evidence that the jury had used the
laptop, let alone that it contained anything improper for the jury to view.
R204-13. The prosecutor proffered that the laptop was just a tool to use
during jury trials, and that it did not have any of his files, email, or case
information on it.

R219, 226-27.

The prosecutor added that he had

discussed the laptop with defense counsel at the time he made the offer, and
that when defense counsel "expressed concern" about it, the prosecutor
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"assured him the laptop contained no case files" and offered to let defense
counsel "check the laptop himself."

R226.

Both parties then "left the

room." Id.
The trial court heard argument on the motion to arrest at sentencing.
R282:13-14, 16-18. It denied the motion because "the laptop was controlled,

it was only for the playing of the 9-1-1 call," and the court did not "see that
it caused any taint at all." R282:21.

B.

Counsel reasonably decided not to object to the use of the
prosecutor's laptop because there was - and is- no evidence
that the jury used the laptop improperly.
Calvert argues that the mere presence of the prosecutor's laptop

during deliberations violated his right to counsel and right to jury trial, and
that this Court should presume prejudice. Aplt.Br. 44-45. It is true that the
c01nplete denial of counsel is structural error, for which prejudice is
presumed. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,469 (1997). But Calvert
was not denied counsel-he has been represented throughout both trial and
appeal.
It is also true that denial of the right to jury trial is structural error.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968). But Calvert also was not
denied a jury trial-he got one. He cites no case-and the State is aware of
none- holding that a defendant was deprived of the rights to counsel and
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jury trial merely because the jury had access to a laptop supplied by the
prosecution.
Indeed, cases from other jurisdictions involving jury access to
prosecution laptops appear overwhelmingly to find harmless errorassuming they find any error at all. See People v. Foreman, case no. D055887,
2010 WL 3705174, *8 (Cal. App., Sep. 23, 2010) (holding that trial court
"could reasonably infer that jurors would have reported any improper use
of the prosecutor's laptop"); Wright, 467 S.W.3d at 244 (rejecting claim
where "Wright has not provided any proof that there was any prejudicial
information on the Commonwealth's laptop" and "Wright has not
produced any evidence that the jury impennissibly used the laptop to
access the internet"); Crews v. Commonwealth, case no. 2012-SC-000596-MR,
2013 WL 6730041, *6-7 (Ky., Dec. 19, 2013) ("The mere fact that jurors had
limited access to the laptop does not create the presumption that they used
it for an improper purpose."); State v. Mayle, case no. 11-0562, 2012 WL

2914271, *3 (W.V., Feb. 13, 2012) (" Although the jury reviewed the audio on
the prosecutor's laptop, there are no specific allegations of information
gleaned from said laptop that was improper."); cf Weber v. State, 971 A.2d
135, 154 (Del. 2009) (holding no error where prosecutor proffered that
laptop contained no material related to case); State v. Jack, case no. 07-02-
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0309, 2013 WL 375538 (N.J. App., Feb. 1, 2013) ("The jurors can be seen
intently watching the laptop screen, and there is no indication that they
could have even seen" papers on the prosecution table, "or how any
information otherwise visible on the papers may have affected their
deliberations.").
Not that there was any error here.

Calvert cannot show deficient

performance because, given the prosecutor's proffer, defense counsel could
have reasonably decided that the laptop was nothing more than a tool to
listen to evidence. And given the court's instruction to consider only the
evidence in the case in reaching a verdict-that is, testhnony and exhibits,
R174-counsel could have reasonably decided that the jurors, if they chose
to use the laptop, would use it only to listen to the 911 call.
Calvert also cites no case that a jury cannot access prosecution tools
like a laptop to review evidence during deliberations. And a number of
cases hold to the contrary. See, e.g., People v. Watson, case no. D056651, 2011
WL 5117723, *18 (Cal. App., Oct. 27, 2011) (holding that prosecution laptop
provided to jury was "not evidence, but only a device to allow viewing of
the evidence"); Commonwealth v. Wright, 467 S.W.3d 238, 244 (Ky. 2015)
(holding that prosecution laptop was equipment "used to play a recording
in the jury deliberation room" and "need not be introduced into evidence").
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Thus, reasonable counsel could have reasonably concluded, under these
circumstances, that there was nothing to object to.
Nor can Calvert show prejudice where any harm is speculative.
There is no evidence in the record that the jury accessed the prosecutor's
laptop at all, let alone that they used it for purposes other than to listen to
the 911 call admitted at trial. See State v. Ashby, 2015 UT App 169, if 47, 357
P.3d 554 (holding no prejudice from sending DVD of victim interview into
deliberations where the "record does not suggest that the jury actually
played the DVD ... during its deliberations"); see also State v. Maestas, 2012
UT 46, iJ54, 299 P.3d 892 (holding no prejudice from failure to admonish
jury where "there is nothing in the record to indicate that the failures to
admonish played any role in the juror's conduct"); State v. Bossert, 2015 UT
App 275,

if if 41-42, 362 P.3d 1258 (upholding denial of mistrial motion based

on allegedly improper jury contact where no evidence that the "theorized
improper contact with the jury occurred").
In sum, Calvert has not shown that counsel was ineffective, nor
shown a violation of his rights to counsel and jury trial, given that Calvert
has· presented no evidence that the jury used the laptop at all, let alone
improperly.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
jCj
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Addenda

Addendurr1 A

§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal ... , UT ST§ 76-1-402

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annos)
Part 4. Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-1-402
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode--Included offenses

Currentness
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision.

4j

(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to
promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:

(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and

(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is an-aigned on the first infom1ation or
indictment.

(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when:

(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or

(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense
otherwise included therein; or

(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.

(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.

(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or ce11iorari, shall determine that
there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included

§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal..., UT ST§ 76-1-402

offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-402; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 2.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-1-402, UT ST§ 76-1-402
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Documl'nt
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§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault--Penalties, UT ST§ 76-5-103

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 5. Offenses Against the Person (Refs & Annas)
Part 1. Assault and Related Offenses
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-103
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault--Penalties

Currentness
(1) Aggravated assault is an actor's conduct:

(a) that is:

(i) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;

(ii) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or

(iii) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another; and

(b) that includes the use of:

(i) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or

(ii) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.

(2)(a) A violation of Subsection (I) is a third degree felony, except under Subsection (2)(b).

(b) A violation of Subsection (1) that results in serious bodily injury is a second degree felony.

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-103; Laws I 974, c. 32, § 10; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 2; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 5, eff. May 1, I 995; Laws
2010, c. 193, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 2010; Laws 2015, c. 430, § 2~ eff. May 12, 2015.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-103, UT ST§ 76-5-103
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Document
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§ 76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in ... , UT ST§ 76-10-506

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 10. Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals
Part 5. Weapons (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-10-506
§ 76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in fight or quarrel

Currentness

(I) As used in this section:

(a) "Dangerous weapon" means an item that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury. The following factors shall be used in determining whether an item, object, or thing is a dangerous weapon:

(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing;

(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; and

(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was exhibited or used.

(b) "Threatening manner" does not include:

(i) the possession of a dangerous weapon, whether visible or concealed, without additional behavior which is threatening; or

(ii) informing another of the actor's possession of a deadly weapon in order to prevent what the actor reasonably perceives
as a possible use of unlawful force by the other and the actor is not engaged in any activity described in Subsection
76-2-402(2)(a).

(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 76-2-402 and for those persons described in Section 76-10-503, a person who, in the
presence of two or more persons, and not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-103, draws or exhibits a dangerous weapon in
an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(3) This section does not apply to a person who, reasonably believing the action to be necessary in compliance with Section
76-2-402, with purpose to prevent another's use of unlawful force:

(a) threatens the use of a dangerous weapon; or

(b) draws or exhibits a dangerous weapon.
-----·--·-·-----------
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(4) This section does not apply to a person listed in Subsections 76-10-523(l)(a) through (e) in performance of the person's
duties.

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-10-506; Laws 1992, c. 10 I, § 3; Laws 2010, c. 361, § 2, eff. May 11, 20 IO; Laws 2014, c. 248, §
1, eff. May 13, 2014.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-10-506, UT ST§ 76-10-506
Current through 2015 First Special Session
Emf of Document
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1
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3
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5
April 30, 2014

6
7

\

I

8

THE COURT:

9

We're here in the matter of State of Utah vs.

10

MR. CARLSON:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Oh,

I apologize.

Okay.

We'll wait for

one second for him.

15

Good morning, Counsel.

16

MR. PHILPOT:

17

I believe

defendant's counsel stepped out to use the restroom.

13

14

Good morning.

Calvert.

11
12

Please be seated.

Good morning, your Honor.

I

apologize.

18

THE COURT;

No worries.

19

We're--We are on the record in the matter of State

20

of Utah vs. Calvert.

We have a jury trial that's going to

21

begin shortly, but prior to that, we've got a motion in limine

22

that was filed by the State and we indicated that we could

23

visit this before we engaged in the trial.

24

So with that, Mr. Carlson, you may proceed.

25

MR. CARLSON:

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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1

Your Honor, evidence of past acts is not admissible

2

to show conformity, but as long as it's admitted for another

3

purpose,

4

The State's proposal to introduce past acts evidence is for

5

three purposes; first,

6

according to State vs. Verde is allowed; second,

7

rebut any claims of accident or mistake which is explicitly

8

allowed under Rule 404(b) (2); and third,

9

of self-defense, which in State v. Labrum,

10

it's okay, as long as it fits certain requirements.

to rebut a claim of fabrication which,
to report--

to rebut any claims
the Court of

Appeals also allowed.

11

Under any of those rebuttal venues,

the doctrine of

12

chances is the best formula under 404(b)

13

there are four factors under the doctrine of chances.

14

State has to show materiality,

15

dispute,

16

the alleged allegation are similar,

17

collaboration but that each event is independent of each other

18

and frequency,

19

than a typical person would be exposed to those situations.

20

similarity,

to evaluate that and
The

that there's a bona fide

that the past acts in the--occurring in
independence,

that there's

that the events have occurred more frequently

On materiality--mater--fabrication, accident,

21

mistake and self-defense are all in bona fide dispute.

22

under some of the theoretical and even--well, some of the

23

scholarly papers that Verde cites,

24

wait to decide materiality until mid-trial,

25

where the State wants to introduce it.
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1

And under State v. Wittison,

the court made it

2

explicitly clear that when a defendant makes a claim at the

3

time of the alleged offense,

that claim can bring an issue

4

into dispute.

the defendant claimed that the

5

alleged victim was lying,

6

dispute by that.

7

In this case,

so fabrication has been brought into

Similarly, he indicates that he was pointing the gun

8

at the ground which is in direct contradiction of the victim

9

that it was pointed directly at him,

10

get directed at him,

11

mistake.

12

suggesting that if it did

it would have been accidental or by

Finally, he indicates that he called his neighbor,

13

Mr. Majors, because he needed help and didn't have time to get

14

his gun, suggesting that there's--there's some sort of desire

15

for self-defense.

16

the three claims.

17

On--materiality has been met under any of
~

Similarly similarity has been met.

The defendant's

18

past threats to kill his other neighbors in 1999 and in 2008

19

are roughly similar to the charged crime.
Third, his independence.

20

Once of these events is

21

alleged to occur--have occurred in West Jordan.

22

the case being tried today.

23

Holladay.

24

Holladay, doesn't know the Holguins in West Jordan.

25

third event occurred in '99 in West Valley City and again,

The previous event occurred in

And to the State's knowledge,

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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1

Patrick Wall,

to the State's knowledge, doesn't know Camille

2

or the--or the Holguins.
Finally,

3

frequency.

The defendant has threatened to

4

kill and claimed self-defense more frequently than the typical

5

personal would have been placed in that situa~ion.

6

extent that I was able,

7

filed motion but it--it's theoretically possible that someone

8

would have to claim self-defense and threaten to kill a

9

neighbor,

To the

I cited statistics and numbers in the

unlikely, but the idea that that had to happen three

10

separate times,

11

doctrine of chances,

12

it--it strains chance.

I mean,

under the

it doesn't fit chance.

Finally, even if the Court decides that, well,

it's

13

admissible for a proper under 404 (b) and under the doctrine of

14

chances,

15

evaluation under 403 to weigh whether it's outweighed

16

substantially by other--unfair prejudice, confusing the

17

issues, misleading the jury or undue delay.

it's admissible,

the Court's supposed to do an

Now, a lot of these Shickles-type factors are over-

18
19

lapped with the doctrine of chances but there are some that

20

are not,

21

act.

22

strong.

23

alleged victims.

24

written statements from the alleged victims as well.

25

specifically the strength of the evidence of other

Now,

the strength of the evidence of the other acts is

In this case, there are witness statements from the
In each of the previous cases,

there are

The needs for the other acts evidence is high and
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1

the efficacy of alternative evidence is--is low.

2

ultimately comes down to--to who the jury is going to believe

3

and in a--in a claim of credibility, the doctrine of chances

4

is extraordinarily useful to the jury in determining what are

5

the chances that this actually occurred so many times.

6

And finally,

other acts,

This case

these specific other acts

7

would not rouse the jury to over-mastering hostility against

8

the defendant.

9

they're not something that they can say, well, he's--he's a

These are extraordinarily similar and so

10

bad person and therefore, we must convict.

11

identical as far as the--the past acts.

12
13

It's--it's almost

And accordingly, we would ask this Court to admit
the past acts evidence.

14

THE COURT:

All right.

15

Response?

16

MR. PHILPOT:

17

Your Honor, my comments may be fairly lengthy,

Yes,

Very good.

your Honor.
I

18

apologize in advance for that and for that purpose,

19

filed an opposition motion if only for the convenience of the

20

Court to follow along.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. PHILPOT:

I have

Okay.
By its motion in limine, the

23

government asks the Court to allow the introduction of

24

irrelevant and impermissibly prejudicial evidence pertaining

25

to two past incidents involving the defendant,
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1

approximately 15 years ago,

2

with four traffic-related violations, the second from six

3

years ago,

4

charged with simple assault.

5

were dismissed at the instigation of government prosecutors,

6

not upon motion by defendant.

7

any court proceedings that produced sworn testimony and in

8

large part, the government is here relying upon distant third-

9

party hearsay to even argue that the evidence should be

10

1999, when defendant was charged

2008, when defendant and his co-resident were each
In both instances, the charges

In neither instance were there

introduced.
Worse,

11

the government makes gratuitous and enormous

12

leaps in logic and further exaggerates wholly irrelevant and

13

dissimilar circumstances to try and make these circumstances

14

applicable under Rule 404(b)

15

theory.

16

in the doctrine of chances

The truth, as ultimately admitted by the government

17

by implication, is that it knows it cannot meet its

18

evidentiary burden at trial and therefore seeks to paint

19

defendant's reputation and credibility by showing he has a

20

propensity to commit assault because of his allegedly bad

21

character.

22

Court's endorsement of its real argument that, because the

23

defendant has shown the propensity and pattern of making

24

verbal threats that in these two past instances amounted to

25

nothing more than hyperbole, the jury should disbelieve any

Specifically,
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1

claim that his conduct in the present circumstance is lawful.

2

This strategy is impermissible and shocking.
THE COURT:

3

4

if you wouldn't mind,

I've got

the brief sitting here in front of me.

5

MR. PHILPOT:

6

THE COURT:

7

Counsel,

1,

Yes.
Instead of just reading the brief,

why

don't you summarize and tell me what the arguments are.

8

MR. PHILPOT:

9

I've got a couple extra pages in here to get rid of.

10

Okay.

First of all,

Thank you,

number one,

your Honor.

the government's motion to

11

admit defendant's past act is really aimed at establishing the

12

propensity to commit a crime.

13

to basically say they're rebutting four things; they're

14

rebutting his claims of fabrication;

15

the defendant's lack of mens rea; three,

16

claim of self defense--excuse me,

17

mistake.

They--they go to great lengths

two,

they're rebutting
rebutting defendant's

number two, accident or
J'

i

If such evidence is really aimed at establishing his

18
19

propensity to commit a crime,

20

proper but unpersuasive legitimate purpose.
THE COURT:

21

in fact,

it should be excluded despite a

il
i

The--

I--I'd agree you with 404(b) evidence if I/

22

it,

is brought in for propensity reasons,

23

admissible, but there--there are reasons that 404 can come in. ,

24

And it seems like the reasons that Mr. Carlson have laid out

25

are a11~-one of them is specifically excepted by 404(b)
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1

the other twos are--both--the other two are certainly allowed

2

under the Verde case.
MR. PHILPOT:

3

What would be your response to that?
I think the Verde case is very

4

different and if you look at our motion, we spell out how

5

they're different.

6

very--that I think is very poignant, your Honor,

Let me see if I can find it,

THE COURT:

7

there's one
in Verde.

I understand that Verde is a sex

Yeah.

8

case and it doesn't have anything to do with the subject

9

matter here, but nonetheless,

it talks about ways to get
;

10

404 (b) evidence in, specifically under the doctrine of chances

11

and it lays kind of a guideline for us in terms of how that

12

works.
What is your response with regard to the doctrine of

13

14

chances?

15

MR.

PHILPOT:

Your Honor,

that's point number two in

16

my brief and I can, again,

17

and so,

18

their materiality.

19

accident, mistake and self-defense at issue, but claiming that

20

someone is lying is not the same as a sole eye witness

21

fabricating elements of testimony.

rather,

you've asked me not to read through

I would say--I would attack,

They attempt this to place fabrication,

22

So the Verde decision--

23

THE COURT:

24

25

first of all,

Wait, wait, wait.

Say that one more

time?
MR. PHILPOT:
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. PHILPOT:

3

THE COURT:

5

MR. PHILPOT:

THE COURT:

8

MR. PHILPOT:

10

Okay.
And Verde admitted only to the

theoretical possibility.

7

9

--is not the same as saying that a

sole eye witness has fabricated elements of his testimony.

4

6

Right.

;

Theoretical possibility of what?

!

That evidence of prior misconduct

could be admitted under Rule 404(b) to establish commission of
criminal acts of reas by rebutting the charge of fabrication.
THE COURT:

11

Well, we're talking about--the

12

fabrication is not by a third party, the fabrication is

13

alleged by your own--by your client, so that's not a third

14

party, that's the first party; right?
MR. PHILPOT:

15

Well, they're saying also that Mr.
t·

.

16

Majors--they've actually admitted in their brief that a lot of

17

people contradict themselves.

18

saying that my client--they're not just alleging that my

19

client may be fabricating inform--or lying, they're alleging

20

other people may be lying as well.
THE COURT:

21

And so I think they're not just

Well, it wouldn't make any difference

22

what other people are saying.

404(b) only applies to your

23

client.

24

comes over and says they saw something completely different,

25

that would not allow 404(b) evidence to come in.

So the question then is not if some other witness
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1

thing 404(b) would allow would be what your client is claiming

2

and in this case, your--the State's claiming that your client

3

is saying he was acting in self-defense,

4

and that the person that--that is making the allegations have

5

actually fabricated those things.
MR.

6

PHILPOT:

it was an accident

And your Honor--okay.

7

go to mistake.

8

make that clear in our motion.

9

THE COURT:

Let's go--let's

They--we're not actually claiming that,

Well,

we

I think what--what the claim is

10

that in fact your client is indicating that the laser he was

11

pointing was pointed at the ground and so the State's asking

12

me to make a leap to say the victim or the alleged victim in

13

this matter is claiming no,

14

me.

15

get from the ground up to the person,

16

your client is saying, well,

17

because that was not my intent,

18

on him,

19

on top of him.

20

mistake.

So if you get from the ground,

the State's saying that

there was obviously some mistake
I didn't plan to put the laser

And that's the State's premise with regard to

MR.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR.

25

from your client saying to·

I was pointing at the ground and somehow it ended up

21

24

the laser was actually pointed at

PHILPOT:

PHILPOT:

Yeah.
Okay.

And we just disagree with that.
And--

I mean, we're not saying that his

actions were a mistake, we're not going to claim that today.
THE COURT:
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1
2

MR. PHILPOT:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. PHILPOT:

5

i

Lawful acts by my client.
Lawful acts?
Yes, your Honor.

Lawful and

defensible.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. PHILPOT:

8

THE COURT:

9

1

the ground to--to--onto the--

So you're talking self-defense?
Yes, your Honor.
Okay.

Affirmative defense. j

Let's talk about self-defense

then.

10

Self-defense is also another reason that 404(b)

11

evidence can come in.

If your client is claiming the reason

12

he did this was under self-defense, then how is it under the

13

doctrine of chances that this exact same scenario happened on

14

two other occasions?

15

MR. PHILPOT:

16

that's what we argue, your Honor.

17

going through each element if you'd like--

18
19

THE COURT:

MR. PHILPOT:

21

THE COURT:

25

I--I'm happy to continue

I just want to have a discussion,
I can read my--

Okay.
--your brief myself.

So tell me--tell

me what--why it is it doesn't apply to a self-defense motion.

23
24

Well,

they're not similar and

I don't want you to read your brief to me,

20

22

It did not,

MR. PHILPOT:

Why the doctrine of chances doesn't

apply?
THE COURT:
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1

specific requirements the Supreme Court put down with regard

2

to Verde as far as the doctrine of chances, where the party's

3

independent.

4

two cases that Mr. Carlson is talking about, they don't know

5

each other, they were actually distant in terms of geography

6

as well, they didn't live in the same area.

7

of chances says, what are the odds that these same people

8

could bring very similar charges or allegations against your

9

client and all be completely independent?

Well, the alleged victims in this case and the

So the doctrine

And the doctrine of

10

chances says, the chances of, okay, in this case somebody

11

brings a false claim allegedly against your client that he

12

pointed a gun with a laser on top of it at them.

13

-that's the claim here, but we have another person that's

14

making a very similar claim and those two cases are very

15

independent.

16

a very similar claim.

17
18

MR. PHILPOT:

20

MR. PHILPOT:

I don't think they are making a very

Tell me why they aren't.
That's why I'm getting a little

confused--

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. PHILPOT:

25

Again, all three making--

similar claim.
THE COURT:

24

That-

Then we've got a third case where they're making,

19

21

Okay.

j

All right.
--by what you're saying because

they're not similar at all.
THE COURT:
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MR.

1

PHILPOT:

First of all,

the claim that my client

2

is--has a gun with a laser pointer, there was no--there was no

3

gun or assault with a deadly weapon in either of the past

4

instances.
THE COURT:

5

6

talking about,

7

threats themselves.

8

situations?

But I think--but I think what he's

not--is not necessarily the gun, but the
Weren't the threats similar in all three

"i
i

MR. PHILPOT:

9

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. PHILPOT:

12

threats existed.

13

accord.

14

Well, no--no,

i

your Honor.

Why weren't they?
First of all, we're not even sure the

The prosecution dropped them at their own

THE COURT:

Well,

that's a strain to the evidence

15

that you'll be able to test but--but tell me why it is you

16

don't think the threats were similar.

17

MR.

PHILPOT:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR.

PHILPOT:

In the current situation-Right.
--there is no claim that the--that

20

the--that our client threatened somebody's life.

21

have the claim by prosecution that in the--in the immediate

22

case--

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. PHILPOT:

25

THE COURT:
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1

MR. PHILPOT:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. PHILPOT:

--involved.
Right.
With a laser pointer.

And our--my

~
~

4

client telling people to get off his property.

5

cases, supposedly my client is making threats against life

6

without weapons,

7

in another where my client is assaulted by someone who the

8

police charged.

9

approached by other people at his own property.

10

In the other

in instances where one is a traffic accident,

In this case, my client is at his home,

~

he is

The factual circumstances and the ability to get to

11

the truth of the circumstances of the present situation are

12

completely different from fifteen years ago and six years ago

13

where the circumstances giving rise to actions by my client

14

thereafter are completely different.

15

saying is that we're supposed to look at these three instances

16

arising from completely different circumstances where weapons

17

are not involved in the other two and suppose that,

18

reason, because of hearsay, we now assume that those things

19

are telling of my client's current situation or his current

20

representation.

21
22
23

THE COURT:

And what the State is

for some

Did he claim self-defense in those other

two instances?
MR. PHILPOT:

Your Honor, he claimed, again,

if

24

we're to believe the allegations of the State, that he was,

25

one instance,

reacting to the attack of another person.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. PHILPOT:

3

THE COURT:

Self-defense?
Yes.
Okay.

How about the other one?
,;

4

MR. PHILPOT:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. PHILPOT:

7

Okay.
Where two vehicles--where his vehicle

crashed into another.

8
9

The other one was a traffic accident.

THE COURT:
is.

Yeah.

I know what a traffic accident

I'm wondering--but something escalated beyond a traffic

10

accident, did it not?

11

defendant said he was going to kill me so that's the reason he

12

did what he did was for self-defense reasons, was it not?

13

did--you're right, there was a traffic accident involved, but

14

the traffic accident was precipitated, Wall reported to the

15

police officer, drove his car directly at Wall's car, swerving

16

out of the way at the last minute, crashing into another

17

vehicle.

18

said he was going to kill me,

19

said, Go ahead and pull your gun out.

20

It says--he said the defendant--the

It

The defendant then called me a mother fucker and

MR. PHILPOT:

reached for the glove box,

I'm not sure how that qualified,

I

I'm--

21

I guess by some stretch of the imagination that qualifies as

22

self-defense, he swerved--again, this--this goes back to where

23

I--I think that they're--that the State is really stretching

24

the elements of the different cases separated by great time--

25

great amounts of time to try and show similarity; two vehicles
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1

approaching each other, one swerves, a man gets mad at the

2

other person because his car crashes into another object is

3

similar to a man at his home at night, arguably with a weapon

4

where other hostile individuals have come.
THE COURT:

5

Well,

6

know.

7

don't I do it right now.

8
9

I mean,

those are the only facts I

We'll ask Mr. Carlson to elaborate.

Actually, why

Mr. Carlson, you can stay right there, Mr.
'cause I'm going to ask more questions.

Philpot,

Would you elaborate

10

on that situation and tell me why it is, where the self-

11

defense element is in that situation?

12

MR. CARLSON:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. CARLSON:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. CARLSON:

17

Yes.
--your Honor?
Yes.
And this--I'm referencing Page 10 of

17 on my motion.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. CARLSON:

20

In the West Valley situation--

Okay.
Specifically No.

5.

In each incident,

the defendant suggested he was not the aggressor.

21

In West Valley,

the defendant allegedly told Capwell

22

to get out of his way and then drove away and that--that

23

admittedly is a weaker--a weaker self-defense situation than

24

the Holladay situation where he explicitly said that he was

25

just trying to protect himself from Camilla Little.
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1

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

2

Anything else, Mr. Philpot?

'
just perhaps the Supreme-- "
1,

[i

Your Honor,

MR. PHILPOT:

3

4

a court case that I think is--that we've quoted, United States

5

v.

Romero.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. PHILPOT:

Right.
I think this is very telling.

One

8

cannot present evidence, the relevance of which is based on

9

the forbidden inference, the person did "X" in the past,

10

therefore, he probably has a propensity for doing "X" and

11

therefore, he probably did "X" this time,

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. PHILPOT:

14
15

he's doing.

too.

Right.
That's exactly what they're saying

They're also--

THE COURT:

Well, that's the definition of 404 (b)

16

evidence; right?

That there are exceptions to that and it's

17

built right in the rule.

18

MR.

PHILPOT:

Yeah.

And we would--yes.

19

would say this is an impermissible application.

20

is allowed,

21

And we
If--if this

it is an impermissible allowance.

The--the government has admitted right in their

22

brief that if they don't have this,

the jury will not be able

23

to make heads or tails of the multiple claims that seem to

24

contradict each other and--and so it's significantly

25

prejudicial.

They're basically saying that without--we don't
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1

have the ability to prosecute the defendant at this time

2

unless you give us this to--to demean his character so that we

3

can convince the jury that he is a bad character.

4

words,

5

witnesses is at issue and because the credibility of our

6

witnesses is at issue, you've got to show these instances of

7

my client to--to convince the jury that their witnesses are

8

credible.

they're saying the credibility of our wit--of our

THE COURT:

9

In other

10

MR. PHILPOT:

11

THE COURT:

But I think you just-It's extremely prejudicial.
Well,

you just made the perfect argument

12

for probability of chances, though;

13

Verde case,

14

guy had done something to him sexually and the point of the

15

case is that that little boy's credibility might be undermined

16

on some level,

17

bring other little boys that are completely independent of

18

this little boy to say the same thing happened to them.

19
20

I mean, under the

there was one little boy that was claiming this

MR.

so what we're going to do is we're going to

PHILPOT:

Against a defendant who lied

specifically about the act itself for which he was accused.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR.

23

right?

PHILPOT:

Well, how did he lie?
He lied about the act,

do the act.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR.

PHILPOT:
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1

THE COURT:

If he were clairning--do you're saying--a

2

say--a claim of self-defense if it's not true, would that be a

3

lie?

4
5

~

MR. PHILPOT:

If a claim of--yes,

that would be a

lie.
THE COURT:

6

Okay.

So that's what we're talking

7

about here; right?

The government's claiming that your--your

8

client's claim of self-defense is not truthful and that's the

9

point for--that's-MR. PHILPOT:

10

I don't think that's the application

11

of Verde.

I think the application of the doctrine of chances

12

is that you have an act which is--which is illegal which has

13

been committed,

14

that is assault--

for example, by my--let's say by my client and

15

THE COURT:

16

MR.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR.

PHILPOT:

PHILPOT:

Right.
--with a deadly weapon.
Right.
That's not what they're saying here.

19

They're not saying that because he assaulted people with a

20

deadly weapon in the past,

21

weapon now.

22

things surrounding totally different,

23

got a--a defendant who says I didn't do that act,

24

sexually assault,

25

my client committed assault with a deadly weapon.

They're saying because of these things,
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1

they're saying in--in these other instances,

2

with a deadly weapon.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR.

5

THE COURT:

it's not assault

Right.

PHILPOT:

It's not even close.
I'm not sure that's a requirement.

The-

6

-I think the claim of the State is that your client had a run-

7

in with someone else where he claimed that he made the same

8

self-defense claim,

9

one person who have self-defense claimed in two separate

10

occasions?

I guess that's what they're asking.
MR.

11

so they're saying what are the odds that

PHILPOT:

Even if that were the appropriate

12

question to ask,

in Verde,

I'd say it's highly likely,

so I

13

don't think the doctrine of chances--there's a very high

14

chance that--that would not occur.

15

what they're saying.

But I don't think that is

I think that what they're saying,

16

inappropriately,

17

all like the allegation in the current instance, have things

18

floating around them,

19

apply,

20

little odd.

21

lying about the act for which the person was accused.

22

is that the--the instances, which are not at

which we're going to piece together to

unlike Verde like Verde.

And I know that's--sounds a

But Verde was very specifically getting at the

THE COURT:

But the Verde lists a number of reasons

23

that that also would apply and if they're saying here that

24

your client made unlawful threats against someone and then

25

claimed self-defense,
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1

case, they're saying--I agree with you with regard to the

2

traffic offense,

3

there, but with regard to the other instance,

4

claiming he made--again made unlawful threats against someone

5

and then was called on it, he claimed self-defense; right?

6

I don't think that there's much on line

MR. PHILPOT:

The--that's actually,

I think they're

theoretically,

7

that's a good question because the prosecution decided not to

8

pursue whether or not he was telling the truth and so we don't

9

know, we don't know why the prosecution decided to not--I

10

mean, it may be that he was absolutely justified, it may br

11

that self-defense didn't matter,

12

it is what they're saying.

13

argue on those cases,

14

defense is really--well,

15

I'm--I'm not sure that the prosecution felt that was really

16

what's at issue in this cases, which is why I thin it's an

17

atrocity to take their theories which do not appear to be

18

based in reality and allow them to dictate the opinions of the

19

jury today relative to my client.

20

THE COURT:

So I--and as I look--if I were to

I would say that I'm not sure selfthey allege he said self-defense.

The theories that aren't related--

21

aren't--tell me what that means,

22

based on reality.

23

I mean, allegedly he claimed

the theories that aren't

What's that?

MR. PHILPOT:

They have had--they have--and I

24

apologize if I'm not making sense, your Honor, but they have

25

taken a standard--
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. PHILPOT:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. PHILPOT:

What standard?
--of the-The Verde?

PHILPOT:

--Verde standard-Okay.
--of the doctrine of chances, which is,

7

a completely different case than what's at issue today.

They

8

have taken today's case and tried to measure it against two

9

other completely different cases and picked little things out

10

of the air that never came to a head or came to issue in those

11

cases, but instead--

12

THE COURT:

13

what do you mean?

14

MR. PHILPOT:

15

guilty,

16

cases.

17

Came--when you say "came to a head,"

The prosecution did not--he was not

the prosecution did not prosecute my client in those

THE COURT:

Well,

the other little boy in the--in

18

the Verde case, he wasn't even--that person--that defendant

19

was not even charged with those cases.

20

MR.

PHILPOT:

He was not even charged.

21

he--I understand that,

22

same act in each instance,

23

24
25

THE COURT:

I thought

your Honor but he was charged with the

No.

so when--when he came to-No.

No.

No, he wasn't.

He wasn't

charged with the--the-MR. PHILPOT:
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR.

3

THE COURT:

4

PHILPOT:

There were little boys in the

MR. PHILPOT:

THE COURT:

8

MR. PHILPOT:

9

THE COURT:

10

MR.

I misspoke.

Right.

But you just said that--

The same criminal act.
Right.

PHILPOT:

But--

In this case, my client is not alleged

to have committed the same criminal act.
THE COURT:

12

13

He was alleg--excuse me,

He was alleged to have committed the same act.

7

11

Right.

neighborhood, he wasn't charged with any of those cases.

5
6

--the other victims in--before--before--

you, Mr.

Okay.

All right.

All right.

Thank

Philpot.

14

Mr. Carlson,

15

MR. CARLSON:

16

On materiality,

response?
Very briefly,

your Honor.

the State acknowledges that if,

17

defense counsel asserts,

18

mistake or accident,

19

there's no materiality for that an that purpose is out the

20

window at the beginning.

21

as

that if there's not any claim of

that that's not on the table,

then

What remains are the claims of fabrication and the

22

claims of self-defense.

23

this situation in that in Verde,

24

is lying.

25

date--the difference being the defendant said it at the date

Here,

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

Verde is extraordinarily similar to
the defendant said little boy

the defendant said,

they're laying.

At the

April 30,

State of Utah v. Calvert
Jury Trial

2014

Page 29
1

of the defense, Verde said it at trial and the court had the

2

chance to review everything.

3

Additionally, on that specific claim of fabrication,

4

the West Valley City case is very relevant because in the West

5

Valley City case, the defendant said he's going to kill him

6

and reaches in his glove box to the point where Patrick Wall

7

believes he's going for a gun to the point where he says, Go

8

ahead and grab your gun, which as happens is exactly what--

9

what occurred in the instant case.

10

As far as the similarity, the State is not alleging

11

that these instances are identical, as if the defendant's

12

establish a modus operandi.

13

identity where--where almost identical situations would be

14

necessary, but for claims of fabrication,

15

defense, which are permissible purposes under State v.

16

the defendant's actions and claimed justifications are

17

relevant for the jury, not to--not to establish a propensity

18

that he's a bad neighbor, but to allow the jury to say, well,

19

what are the chances that someone has to defend themselves

We're not trying to establish

claims of selfLabrum,

i

l

What are the chances ~

20

against two or three separate neighbors?

21

that three different neighbors have said this guy has

22

threatened to kill me and this--and this neighbor is lying?

23
24
25

And for those reasons, we would ask that the
evidence be admitted.
THE COURT:
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1

brief and I apologize,

2

introduce that evidence?

3

MR. CARLSON:

don't remember, how will you

I

It would be specifically with--with

4

leave of the Court,

5

would be through Patrick Wall, Camilla Little and Officer

6

Imidge in West Valley City.
THE COURT:

7

it would be through three witnesses.

Okay.

Well,

It

I find that based upon the

8

standards set out in Verde,

9

their goals--all of the--the requirements from Verde as argued

10

I believe the State has met all of

by Mr. Carlson.
The traffic incident,

11

I think,

is a little bit far

12

afield and for that reason,

13

in,

14

Holladay matter,

15

don't think that it's a--I don't think it's being brought in

16

for propensity under 404(b),

17

one of the noted factors,

18

self-defense.

19
20
21

I'm not going to allow that one

but the other incident, however,

I believe that's the

I do believe fits under all of those.

I

I believe it's coming in to rebut

that being fabrication as well as

Then I look under the doctrine of chances and all of
the elements as explained by Mr. Carlson have been laid out.
Lastly,

I weigh the 403 balancing and I find that

22

the probative value,

23

is not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect.

24

for that reason,

25

will be admitted.
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MR. CARLSON:

1
2

need it.
THE COURT:

3

4

THE BAILIFF:

6

THE COURT:

MR. PHILPOT:

9

THE COURT:

We have 12 exhibits.
We shouldn't, what--what was the

The State's Exhibit No. 7.
7.

I have 7,

I have 7 plus 4.

Is that-

-that's eleven; right?

11
12

We'll let them listen to

twelfth?

8

10

Very good.

that if they--

5

7

I've got a laptop if they--if they

So I've got--No. 1 I have is a large picture of a
house.

13

No. 2 of the 9-1-1 telephone call.

14

No. 3 is the large picture of Hugo's house again.

15

No. 4 is another large picture of the house.

16

5 is a picture of the gun.

17

6 is a picture of the gun.

18

And 7 is a picture of the garage that came in this

19

morning.

20

Then for the defense, we've got the Canales witness

21

statement, the Andrew Holguin witness statement,

22

Holguin witness statement--I guess I shouldn't say Holguin--

23

Holguin witness statement, and 4 is Kelsey Pitts' witness

24

statement.

25

And those are everything I have.
Is that what you show as well?
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P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2

(Transcriber's Note:

3

Speaker identification

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

4
5

July 1, 2014

6
7

8

THE COURT:

9

Good afternoon.

10

We're here today for the Tuesday

afternoon criminal calendar.
MR. CARLSON:

11
12

Please be seated.

Who is ready to start us out?

Your Honor, we're ready to handle the

Calvert matter.

13

THE COURT:

Very good.

14

All right.

Let's call the case of the State of Utah

15

Come on forward.

vs. Calvert.

16

Good afternoon, Mr. Calvert.

17

MR. CALVERT:

18

THE COURT:

19

today with regard to this case.

20

here--the first is Mr. Philpot's motion to arrest judgment on

21

the jury verdict and the second then, based on how this one

22

turns out will be on the pre-sentence report or the sentencing

23

of Mr. Calvert.

Good afternoon, your Honor.
There were two things in front of me
The first--let me pull it up

24

So with that, Mr. Philpot,

25

MR. PHILPOT:
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you may proceed.

your Honor.
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1
2

I would like to begin by quoting from the State's
opposition to my motion to arrest.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. PHILPOT:

All right.
Quote:

The State did not introduce

5

evidence that the defendant intended to harm Hugo Holguin

6

because the law does not require it.

7

and irreconcilable.

8
9

That is determinative

There are cases very clear in the State of Utah, one
of which is Loffel which requires intent, says where

10

circumstances like this, where the statute does not specify

11

what the mens rea is, the default is intent, where the State

12

says we didn't argue intent, then--

13

1
;

THE COURT:

I think the default,

if I--if I--if I'm

14

correct in that and maybe--I think the statute actually says

15

if it's not--if the mens rea is not particularly described in

16

the statute, then it defaults to intentionally,

17

reckless, does it not?

18

MR. PHILPOT:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. PHILPOT:

knowingly or

That is correct, your Honor.
Okay.
I'

And the State did not present any

21

evidence on knowingly, they did not present anything on

22

recklessness, they--and they admit now that they did not

23

present anything on intent.

24

they need to have one of those; in fact,

25

THE COURT:

0epomaxMerit Litigation
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there's--

Well, wait a minute.

So if--if a person
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1

points a gun at another person,

2

recklessly assaulting that person?
MR. PHILPOT:

3

Well,

you don't think that's

I would imagine that there's

4

some circumstance out there where it could be but that's not

5

applicable in this case.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. PHILPOT:

8

THE COURT:

MR. PHILPOT:

T~E COURT:

14

MR. PHILPOT:

Well,

then I would say Oldroyd

Tell me what would have to happen.
They would have to prove that he had

the intent to do or the intent to cause bodily harm.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. PHILPOT:

18

mean,

19

that.

Okay.
Well,

Tell me how you do that.
they have to show--I don't--I

I think there's a multitude of ways that they could do
I--

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. PHILPOT:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. PHILPOT:

24

THE COURT:

25

You mean there's no evidence that your

clarifies that it's not enough just to show or display a gun.

13

15

there was no

client pointed the gun with the laser at one of these people?

11
12

It was not argued,

evidence presented.

9

10

Tell me why it's not.

Give me an example.
Some indication that he was-Could he point a gun at you?
No--

If I point a gun at you right now, am I

showing any intent that I want to hurt you?

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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1

MR. PHILPOT:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. PHILPOT:

Not if it's conditioned,

your Honor.

Conditioned on what?
If it's conditioned upon statements

4

continuously admitted to by everybody who testified that it

5

was qualified by get off my property.

6

this isn't a barroom brawl or a parking lot brawl where

7

somebody comes out and they're fighting in a parking lot and

8

he whips out a gun,

9

on,

he's angry,

invading a home;

Because this isn't a--

points the gun or he's hood

this is a man in his own home who comes

10

out,

is approached by somebody else,

11

statement, every witness that testified said that he said get

12

off my property.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR.

15

THE COURT:

PHILPOT:

Well,

conditions--every

the only--

And so the intent is---the only problem was,

though,

there

16

was a lot of credible evidence indicating that he never really

17

was on the property.

18

MR.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR.

PHILPOT:

PHILPOT:

He admits-So where did that put us-He admitted that he came off the prop-

21

-on the property.

22

admitted he came over,

23

And so--and so let's move to the next step,

24

where--where in defense of habitation,

25

presented no evidence of intent,
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angry.

the presumption

if the State says we've
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1

that he has--that he's acting reasonably, that his intent is

2

reasonable.

3

of intent,

4

overcome the presumption that he acted reasonably in defense

5

of habitation?

And if they again say we've presented no evidence
the law does not require us to, then how do you

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. PHILPOT:

8

THE COURT:

9

Wait a minute.

I--

There's no evidence---I'm still having a hard time

understanding how it is you could point a gun at somebody and

10

under a reckless standard would not be threatening that

11

person.

12

kill that person, under a reckless standard--under a--that

13

might be manslaughter or something less than that,

14

nonetheless, by pointing an item at another person that

15

potentially could cause death, why wouldn't that be reckless?

16

If that were to go--if that gun were to go off and

MR. PHILPOT:

The jury was instructed that he had to

17

have the intent to have bodily harm,

18

or the threat--or a threat to do bodily injury.

19
20

THE COURT:

23

24
25

And they--

You mean just as far as the--are we just

talking about the assault?

21
22

to do--to do bodily harm,

MR.

PHILPOT:

Yes.

The intent to commit the

assault.
THE COURT:
is not a threat;

is that what you're telling me?

MR. PHILPOT:

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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And if the
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1

State had-THE COURT:

2

Whoa.

3

depends.

4

would not be a threat.

5

MR. PHILPOT:

6

Whoa.

Tell me how that

If I point a gun at you, give me the instance that

When we're playing capture the flag

with fake guns, we're--you're--

7

THE COURT:

8

okay.

9

with a laser on it--

Okay.

All right.

Let me--let me change the facts.

10

MR.

11

THE COURT:

12

Whoa.

PHILPOT:

Uh-huh

Fair enough.

Let--

If I have a real gun

(affirmative).

--and I point it at you,

tell me when

that would not be a threat?

13

MR. PHILPOT:

14

THE COURT:

Defense of habitation.
Okay.

That's a whole different issue,

15

though.

We aren't talking about defense of habitation,

16

talking about now the intent required for aggravated assault,

17

so help--

18

MR.

PHILPOT:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR.

It's not just the threat,

we're

it's--

--tell me how that wouldn't be a threat.

PHILPOT:

It's not just a threat,

21

to do bodily injury.

22

unlawful,

23

not Loffel, Oldroyd,

24

weapon, waves it around,

25

intent to do bodily injury.

it's a threat

And the--the appeals court has clarified

that it has to be--the intent can't just--excuse me,

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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And what we heard in evidence is there was--so I--I

1
2

could maybe grant you that there's a threat, a threat to get

3

off my property-THE COURT:

4
5

if I pull the trigger I'm going to kill you.

6

MR. PHILPOT:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. PHILPOT:

9

Or a threat to do bodily injury because

That's correct.
Okay.

So that would be a threat then.

That would be an attempt and that's

another-THE COURT:

10

No,

that wouldn't be an attempt.

It

11

says and a threat accompanied by a show of immediate force or

12

violence to do bodily harm to another.

If I point a gun at you, tell me why that would not

13

14

be a threat to cause you harm
MR. PHILPOT:

15

Because--it could be a threat,

16

-that's not the--that's not the statute,

17

threat to do bodily injury.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. PHILPOT:

20

THE COURT:

but it-

the statute is a

And so--

What else would it be a threat to do?
To--to get off my property.
No.

No.

No.

No.

A threat--if I point

21

a gun at you, why wouldn't that threaten bodily injury?

22

only reason it would threaten bodi--the only reason it's a

23

threat is

24

threat; right?

25

'cause if I--if I pointed a pen at you,

MR. PHILPOT:

DepornaxMerit Litigation
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1

THE COURT:

Because I can't do anything wrong with

2

it.

3

because I pull the trigger and I'll--and you're dead.

But if I point at you,

4

MR. PHILPOT:

the reason it's a threat is

I--I disagree,

your Honor.

I think

5

there can be moments where a person points a pen at somebody

6

and-THE COURT:

7

8

Okay.

MR. PHILPOT:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. PHILPOT:

12

THE COURT:
and pointed it at you,

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. PHILPOT:

17

THE COURT:

No,

your Honor.

PHILPOT:

If I put a loaded gun right now

would I--would I be threatening you?
Possibly--possibly, but-Possibly?
Yeah,

I--your--your Honor--

How is it that pointing a loaded gun at

another person would not be a threat?

19

MR. PHILPOT:

20

clarified,

21

Court in particular,

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. PHILPOT:

25

Right.

Okay.

MR.

24

I'm

--am I threatening you right now?

14

18

I'm--right now,

pointing this pen at you--

9

13

Right now,

Because the--the courts have

the appeals courts in particular and the Supreme
that it's not enough to threaten-Under what case?
Oldroyd and Loffel, L-o-f-f-e-1.

it's not enough-THE COURT:

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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1

person to threaten them?

2
3

MR.

PHILPOT:

Specifically Oldroyd makes it clear

that simply displaying and waving it around--

4

THE COURT:

5

waving it.

6

person,

We're not talking about displaying and

We're talking about pointing the gun at another

that's what we're talking about.

7

MR. PHILPOT:

8

THE COURT:

9

That's what you're telling me?

i t in my waistband,

Okay.
That's not displaying or--if I show you

I agree,

I haven't threatened you.

10

wave it around over here,

11

put that laser beam on your body,

12

Do you agree?

13

MR.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR.

16

PHILPOT:

And your Honor,

17
18

PHILPOT:

I haven't threatened you.

Possi--no,
Okay.

When I

now you're being threatened.

I won't,

because my--

All--

It's against my defendant's interests.

the State has also--

THE COURT:

So whether it's true or not,

it doesn't

matter.

19

MR.

20

THE COURT:
can't do it

PHILPOT:

No,

that's not--

But that's what you just said,

21

I

22

you whether or not that's the truth or not.

23

If I

MR.

'cause it's against his interest.

PHILPOT:

No,

you said

I'm asking

you're asking--you're asking me to

24

hypothesize on what may be and I don't want to do that when

25

the state's already admitted--

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

July 1,

2014

State of Utah v. Calvert
Sentencing
Page 12 ·

1

THE COURT:

No,

I'm not--I'm--I'm asking you to

2

consider the facts that I saw in this trial and the facts in

3

the trial were there were people that saw him put this laser

4

beam on people--on people's chests.

5

MR.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. PHILPOT:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. PHILPOT:

10

PHILPOT:

And if he did-Right.
--point the gun-Right.
--and if his intent was to remove from

his property, then that is not aggravated assault.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. PHILPOT:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR.

PHILPOT:

PHILPOT:

Okay.

I--

If his intent---I understand your argument.
Okay.
Do you have anything else?
I--I've already mentioned to you the

17

presumption of reasonableness which comes with the self-

18

defense of habitation.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR.

PHILPOT:

Okay.
And if there's an admission that there

21

is no evidence presented on intent,

22

understanding,

23

knowledge, and if there was--

24

THE COURT:

25

evidence,

then--and--and also,

no evidence presented on recklessness or

No evidence--okay,

you're not saying--
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1

MR. PHILPOT:

2

THE COURT:

It was not part of the State's---you're not saying that--as long as

3

we're clear, there was evidence that he lifted the gun and put

4

the laser beam on the person's body, but your contention would

5

be that that would not be evidence.
MR. PHILPOT:

6

My contention is the State

7

acknowledges that they did not introduce evidence,

8

that affirmatively in their opposition.
THE COURT:

9

All right.

MR. PHILPOT:

10

Finally,

they say

What else?
your Honor, the laptop.

11

Allowing the laptop to go back in any case is unreasonable.

12

There was a Supreme Court case--

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. PHILPOT:

15

the Court.

16

unreasonable.

17

In any case is unreasonable?
Yes.

Yes.

Unless it's the laptop of

But when it's the prosecution's laptop,

that is

There was a Supreme Court case last week on a

18

different facts but similar principle,

19

California where the State argued that if somebody has a

20

wallet and a cell phone,

21

wallet.

22

phone is not like a wallet because it's a multitude of

23

information and opportunities that a person has to do all

24

sorts of things and to gather all sorts of information.

25

the cell phone should be treated as a

And the Supreme Court said a wallet--or a--a cell

A laptop?
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1

magazine goes back--

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. PHILPOT:

4

THE COURT:

Right,

but let's say in this--

--it's been---in this case that when the jury wanted

5

to hear the 9-1-1 call,

6

play the call for them and bring the laptop back out.

7

that infected the jury?

8

MR.

9

12

Hypothetically,

it still taints the jury,
THE COURT:

10
11

PHILPOT:

the bailiff would take the laptop in,
Has

if that happened, yes,

it destroys the--

How does that--tell me how it taints the

jury.
MR. PHILPOT:

It destroys the notions of fairness.

13

It makes it impossible for the public to believe that the jury

14

is beyond reproach.

15

come with a laptop and send it back with the jury without

16

rifting--beyond reproach?

Can I send my laptop every time?

17

THE COURT:

18

MR.

19

THE COURT:

20

Mr. Carlson?

21

MR. CARLSON:

22

PHILPOT:

Anything else?

I don't think so.
Okay.

No,

your Honor.

Very good.

I'm going to address these in the

order that we addressed in the motion--

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. CARLSON:

25

Okay.

Can I

about mens rea first.

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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July 1,

State of Utah v. Calvert
Sentencing

2014

Page 15

1

intent to cause injury.

2

and under the old version,

3

second-degree felony,

4

defendant intended to cause bodily harm.

5

was about,

6

There weren't injuries in this case
pre-2010 of the Code,

to get a

the State had to prove that the
And so the mens rea

not the action but the result of that action.
Now,

that wasn't the law in this case and we weren't

7

asserting injury, we weren't asserting a second-degree felony

8

but a third-degree felony.

9

defendant engaged in the assaultive conduct, he did so

We were saying that with the

10

intentionally or knowingly.

11

instructed the jury on recklessly,

12

Loffel says we also could have
but we didn't do that here.

The State's position is that even under the

13

defendant's version of events,

14

Hugo Holguin.

15

intentionally pointed the loaded gun at Hugo Holguin and he

16

told Adon Holguin,

17

to be a mess up, as he did so.

18

he pointed that loaded gun at

It wasn't an accident that it came up,

if you don't get out of here,

there's going

All of this indicates that his actions were

19

intentional or at the very least,

20

that behavior.

21

the conduct but the conduct itself.

22

he

Again,

knowing,

when he engaged in

the mens rea is not about the result of

As far as the defense of self and defense of

23

habitation,

24

The defendant's version of events was so drastically different

25

from the version of every other witness who testified,

this is where the jury came down to credibility.
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1

jury had no choice but to weigh the credibility.

2

considered the factors that are appropriate and that they were

3

instructed to do so.

4

testimony of all nine other witnesses that saw what happened

5

that day was more credible than the defendant's version and

6

that he was not acting in defense of habitation or defense of

7

self.

8
9

And they

Accordingly, they decided that the

Finally, as far as the laptop, the State pays part
of the light bills in this building and--and the jury used the

10

light to look at the evidence that day.

But the fact that

11

they used something that the State provided to consider the

12

evidence doesn't taint that evidence.

13

defense counsel cites is a Supreme Court of Florida case where

14

the jury was given an article that says defense attorneys

15

attack prosecutors and victims.

16

to look at the evidence through a certain lens.

17

direct contrast to the laptop, which is a tool to present the

18

information that was admitted into evidence.

19

theoretically could have been abused--and I want to be clear,

20

there is no indication from anyone that it was abused,

21

just a hypothesis that it could have been abused,

22

disqualify because as Riley vs. California makes clear, most

23

of us carry around our lives in our pockets now with a smart

24

phone.

25

jury not to look at outside evidence and not to use their

The only case that

That clearly invites the jury
That's in

The fact that it

this is

should not

And this Court acknowledged that when it instructed th
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1

smart phones but simply to focus on the evidence in this case. ·
We gave the jury the tool to listen to the CD that

2

3

was admitted into evidence, without objection.

4

they used that tool, maybe, again, we don't know that they

5

even listened to the call, the fact that they may have used

6

that tool should not taint--would not taint the verdict.

7

it does do, your Honor, is it--it shows a repeated pattern on

8

the part of defense counsel to suggest prosecutorial

9

misconduct.

Now,

The fact that

What·

I'm not asking for a Rule 11 sanction today

10

but the first day of trial, he accuses of--of pursuing a win

11

at all cost strategy.

12

witnesses are late, he says that I tampered with the

13

witnesses, even though he sent a subpoena telling the to go to

14

the second floor.

15

he says, oh, well, the laptop went back.

16

when we discussed this explicitly that I was leaving the

17

laptop in the courtroom before we went out, he did not raise

18

an objection before the Court at the time the verdict came in,

19

he waits 47 days.

20

The second day of trial when his

And then 47 days after the verdict comes in
And same surprise,

And there is appellate case law that suggests

21

there's a certain time restraint so that the Court can

22

promptly address any improprieties.

23

improper,

24

to present information.

25

specifically, it's--it's a State laptop.

This laptop was not

it was a tool--the whole purpose of that laptop is

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

It's not any prosecutor's laptop
And just like the

July 1,

2014

State of Utah v. Calvert
Sentencing
Page 18

1

State's tripod doesn't taint a verdict or the State lights

2

don't taint a verdict, the State laptop should not either.

3

THE COURT:

4

Mr. Philpot, would you like to respond to that?

5

MR. PHILPOT:

Thank you.

Yes,

~

your Honor.

I noticed that the

6

State offers no explanation as to whether or not there was

7

present any effort to introduce evidence about recklessness or

8

knowledge,

9

opposition.

10

let alone intent, which they clearly deny in their

Loffel still makes clear that there is a default

11

standard for the statute and whether or not the State did in

12

fact, agree with that or not,

13

clear, that the default is intent.

14

it's there,

Loffel makes that

There's also a presumption of reasonableness for the

15

defendant in defense of habitation.

16

present evidence on his intent, how can they overcome a

17

presumption?

18

belabor that point.

19

able to find intent when there's an admission that there was

20

no evidence presented.

21

Again,

The laptop,

And if they did not

I--I've said this before and I'll not
It--it evades reason that the jury is

I don't think we can possibly compare

22

lights or tripods to laptops.

23

the prosecution,

24

to listen in on the proceedings.

25

access outside influences.
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1

magazine, they could read a number of magazines, only

2

restrained in that number by the time that they have in the

3

jury room.

4

wi-fi capable, owned by the prosecution not taint the jury.

5

As to what they did with it, we have-THE COURT:

6

7

Do you know the--do you know the

laptop's wi-fi capable?
MR. CARLSON:

8
9

If a magazine can taint a jury, how can a laptop,

I'm not a hundred percent sure it is,

your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. PHILPOT:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. PHILPOT:

Do you know that it is?
I have no idea.
Okay.
But it still taints the perception of

14

the public that they are beyond reproach, more so than a

15

magazine possibly could.

16

Again,

17

prosecution's laptop back,

18

to every trial I ever come to and that's just unreasonable on

19

its face,

20

I would say if it's okay to send the
then I will bring mine,

ready to go

as is sending the prosecution's laptop.
Now, the prosecution tries to say that we believe

21

there is prosecutorial misconduct, which we did not say.

22

simply claimed that there could be a problem; however,

23

did say there was prosecutorial misconduct, we wouldn't be in

24

error in the fact--because due to the fact that there is facts

25

that exist which call into question whether or not it should
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1

have gone.

2

that shouldn't have gone back.

3

THE COURT:

4

The fact that it went back is enough for us to say

What should have happened for those

folks to listen to that 9-1-1 call?
MR.

5

PHILPOT:

The--with all due respect,

your Honor,

6

the Court needed to be prepared to allow them to listen to

7

that.

8

the jury--

9

It is not the obligation of the defense to insure that

THE COURT:

I'm not asking that question.

I'm

10

asking what would be allowable to allow them to listen to the

11

9-1-1 call,--

12

MR.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR.

15

PHILPOT:

PHILPOT:

Some sort of--in your opinion?

~

Some sort of CD player in the back,

in

the jury room.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR.

18

THE COURT:

19

For the reasons stated,

PHILPOT:

Okay.
All right.
Thank you.

All right.

I'm going to deny the--for

20

the reasons stated by Mr. Carlson,

21

motion of the--of the defense.

22

proper mens rea was demonstrated.

23

claim was negated based purely on--on credibility of the

24

witnesses, when nine said one thing and the defendant's story

25

was so much different.

DepornaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

I'm going to deny the

I believe the intent,

the

I believe the self-defense

July 1,

State of Utah v. Calvert
Sentencing

2014

Page 21
And last of all,

1

the--the laptop was controlled,

2

was only for the playing of the 9-1-1 call and I don't see

3

that it caused any taint at all.

4
5

So based upon that then,

Have you had a chance to review the pre-sentence
report with your client?

8

MR. PHILPOT:

9

THE COURT:

10

Yes,
Okay.

your Honor.
Are there any factual

inadequacies that need to be addressed?

11

MR. PHILPOT:

12

THE COURT:

13

let's move to sentencing.

You can bring your client up.

6
7

I--I do not believe so,
All right.

your Honor.

If that's the case, go ahead

and proceed.

14

MR. PHILPOT:

Your Honor, we would ask primarily

15

that the Court show mercy in sentencing for prison time.

16

client is a--

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. PHILPOT:

19

THE COURT:

20

recommendation here for prison.
MR. PHILPOT:

21
22

Did you say for prison time?
Yes, your Honor.
I don't think there was any

I'm sorry.

I thought there was a

recommendation for a minimum.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. PHILPOT:

25

it

Honor.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. PHILPOT:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. PHILPOT:

Oh,

that's okay.

I apologize.
That's all right.
We would ask that you commute jail

time.

6

which are dependent upon him.

7

represented no threat in that neighborhood, he's got neighbors

8

who has reported that he is a productive and kind and helpful

9

neighbor.

This case is old, he has

He's pre--he's presented no threat to the victims

in this case.

11

And to put him in jail, your Honor, would not allow-

12

-would sever his ability to have a job, it would take away his

13

home, it would destroy his ability to raise his animals and it

14

just does not serve the public nor the interests of justice to

15

do that to this man.

16

THE COURT:

17

Anything, Mr Carlson?

18

MR. CARLSON:

19

1
;

My client has a good job, he has a home, he has animals

5

10

~

Okay.

Thank you.

Yes, your Honor.

There's four points

that I'd ask the Court to consider.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. CARLSON:

Okay.
First,

the defendant refuses to take

22

any accountability for his actions whatsoever.

23

civil rights were violated on Page 3, when he talks about how

24

he may appeal the case.

25

statements and the statements of his supporting friends,
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